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House Bill 588 was enacted by the 75th Legislature in 1997.  This bill was a 
response to the Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 
U.S. 1033 (1996) ruling that banned the use of affirmative action policies at The 
University of Texas School of Law.  It was an alternative to the traditional use of race in 
university admissions decisions and guarantees automatic admission to the top 10 percent 
of each high school graduating class in the state.   
This study focused on the deliberations and actions of 75th Legislature in Texas.  
It was guided by Meranto’s (1967) input-output model designed to show how 




the system to produce a new output.   
The study addressed four questions:  (1) How did members of the Texas 
Legislature perceive the Hopwood ruling?; (2) What influence did the implementation of  
the Hopwood ruling have on the policymaking process of the 75th Legislative Session?;  
(3) What conditions within the Texas Legislature favored the final construction of House 
Bill 588, and what were the final provisions of the legislative policy addressing minority 
representation in higher education?; and (4)What key strategies did the author of House 
Bill 588 implement to facilitate the development and passage of the bill?        
Findings of the study include:  (a) minority legislators anticipated that the 
Hopwood ruling would have an adverse affect on minority representation in higher 
education and sought a legislative response; (b) House Bill 588 was enacted in response 
to the ruling; (c) three conditions within the system were instrumental in the passage of 
this bill; and (d) five key strategic maneuvers further secured the bill’s success.               
The study provides other states and policy analysts factors that can be used in 
place of race in admissions criteria.  The study also provides insight into how support was 
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CHAPTER I   
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996) banned the use of affirmative action policies at The University of Texas at 
Austin School of Law.1  In response, former Texas Attorney General Dan Morales 
(1996a, 1996b) issued guidelines prohibiting the consideration of race in all state 
university admissions, financial aid and student recruitment and retention efforts.  
Concerned that minority enrollment in higher education would suffer, the Texas 
Legislature assumed an unprecedented role in admissions policies.  In 1997, the 75th 
Legislature responded to the Morales ruling’s anticipated effects by enacting House Bill 
588, which established uniform admissions and reporting procedures for the State’s 
institutions of higher education.  This legislation was intended to ensure the diversity of 
student populations at State institutions (House Higher Education Committee Report, 
1997). 
This study analyzed the development and enactment of House Bill 588.  It 
focused on:  (1) determining the influence of various societal factors, primarily the 
Hopwood ruling and Morales’ interpretation, on the policymaking process of the 75th 
Legislature; (2) reviewing the conditions within the 75th Legislature that favored the final 
construction of House Bill 588; (3) reviewing the final provisions of the bill; and (4) 
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1 A remedy for past cases of discrimination with present effects was permitted.  See Hopwood , 78 F.3d at 
962.  However, Morales (1996b) cautioned that “it is almost impossible to prove present effects of past 
discrimination” ( p. 1).   
identifying the strategies utilized by the key legislative stakeholders to ensure the 
successful enactment of the bill. 
 
Statement of the Problem  
Historically, the Texas Legislature left decisions regarding admissions policies to 
individual colleges and universities.   However, in light of Hopwood, Texas colleges and 
universities began to restructure their admissions policies, eliminating race as a factor 
(Ackerman, 1996).  This generated concern about the effect these admissions changes 
would have on minority representation in higher education.  Mexican-American Senator 
Gonzalo Barrientos and other minority lawmakers were concerned that “Texas’ top 
minority students will be lured to states offering scholarships that consider a student’s 
race” (Brooks, 1997b, p. B6) since Hopwood applied only to the Fifth Circuit Court’s 
jurisdiction, which includes Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi (Morales, 1996a).  
Mexican-American Representative Irma Rangel was concerned that the ruling would not 
only affect minority enrollment at professional schools, specifically The University of 
Texas School of Law, but also at all universities in the State. In an interview she said, “It 
was going to affect the undergraduate schools,” as well.        
When The University of Texas at Austin reported the effects of the Hopwood 
ruling, its statistics on the first post-Hopwood freshman class showed that:    
37 percent of African-American high school seniors who applied to UT-Austin 
for regular admission had been accepted, down from 54 percent the last year.  The 
admission rate for Latino seniors also fell, while the admission rate for white and 
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Asian applicants rose.  The number of applications from all groups also fell, but 
the decrease was proportionately greatest among black and Latino applicants.  
(Lubman, 1997, p. A1)  
 At Texas A&M University, applications in 1997 from African-American students 
fell by 10 percent and from Hispanics by 7 percent (Lum, 1997).  Texas A&M University 
President Ray Bowen said, “There’s no question that Hopwood is upsetting 
people….People are thinking they shouldn’t bother to apply here when Harvard and 
everyone else is making them better offers” (Lum, 1997, pp. A1, A8).  Michael Sharlot, 
dean of The University of Texas School of Law where the Hopwood case originated said, 
“There’s no chance we can go on competing successfully in drawing qualified minorities 
if things continue this way” (Lum, 1997, pp. A1, A8).   
Some campus administrators began calling the drop in minority applications and 
admission rates “the Hopwood effect” (Lubman, 1997, p. A1).  Others, like Bruce 
Walker, director of admissions at The University of Texas viewed the drop as somewhat 
insignificant.  According to Walker, “the race-neutral policies resulted in comparable 
numbers of minorities being offered admission, especially after the drop in applicants” 
(“350 Fewer,” 1997, p. B2).   
A University of Texas law school graduate who commented on the law school’s 
previous use of separate committees to review applications based on ethnicity said, “We 
like the notion of equal opportunity, but equal protection applies to everyone….That’s 
not a bad thing.  That’s not a novel thing, either” (Lum, 1997, pp. A1, A8).  Then-director 
of the Center for Mexican American Studies at The University of Texas at Austin, David 
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Montejano (1997), noted that access and opportunity did not always apply to everyone.  
He wrote:  
The law school [University of Texas at Austin] was officially “integrated” when 
the U.S. Supreme Court ordered that it accept Heman Sweatt in 1950, but it would 
take twenty more years before the school went beyond token integration.  The 
undergraduate student body remained virtually White until President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson began to push for civil rights in 1964.  (p. 135) 
Montejano (1997) stated that until 1975, when the University first began 
compiling statistics on minority enrollment, African-Americans comprised less than 2 
percent of the student population.  He also pointed out that Hispanic2 students, which 
included students from Latin America and Spain, were only 5 percent of students.  A 
major newspaper in the State reported similar findings; see Table 1 (Roser & Phillips, 
1996, p. A1).  As the table indicates, after 1975 there were gradual gains in minority 
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2 The term “Hispanic” will be used hereafter when referring to general student populations of Mexican-
American and Latin American descent.  However, the term “Mexican-American” will be used when 
identifying an individual of this specific heritage.      
Table 1 
______________________________________________________ 
 Diversity at University of Texas 
Before 1975, the University of Texas did not track enrollment by ethnic group for fear of  
appearing to discriminate. 
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
                  White  80.3% 84.7% 79.2% 75.6% 69.8% 65.6% 
 American Indian      .3     .1     .2     .2     .3     .4__ 
African American    1.7   2.5   3.0   3.4   3.6   4.0__ 
   Asian American      .5   1.0   2.3   4.8   6.8   9.9__ 
              Hispanic    5.6   7.3   8.5   9.4 11.2 12.7__ 
                Foreign    3.8    4.3   6.8   6.5   8.3   7.5__ 
                  Other     1.6     .0     .0   n/a   n/a   n/a__ 
            Unknown    6.4     .0     .0   n/a   n/a   n/a__ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
     UT law school 
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
                  White  83.0% 84.6% 78.5% 82.3% 78.1% 74.8% 
 American Indian      .4     .1     .2     .2     .5              ..3__ 
African American    2.0   4.3   7.7   3.9   6.5   6.6__ 
   Asian American      .2 10.4   1.0   1.1   2.4   5.8__ 
              Hispanic    5.2     .3 12.0            11.6 11.3 11.7__ 
                Foreign      .6     .0    .6     1.   1.1     .9__ 
                  Other     2.6     .0    .0   n/a   n/a   n/a__ 
            Unknown     60         .0   n/a   n/a   n/a__ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  University of Texas Institutional Studies 
 
Note.  From “Texas to fight affirmative action ruling,” by M. A. Roser & J. Phillips, March 27, 1996,  
Austin American-Statesman, p. A1. 
 
 
After Hopwood, the reported decline in minority applications and admissions to 
the two major institutions of Texas served as an indicator that past gains in minority 
admissions in higher education—resulting from judicial rulings—were at risk.  Prior to 
Hopwood, the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265 (1978) 
decision had “been used by universities and professional schools across the country 
for…two decades in designing programs to increase black and Hispanic enrollment” 
(Stutz, 1996b, pp. A1, A20).  Any change was of particular concern to minority 
legislators, especially because a decline in minority applications was in direct contrast to 
the rising number of minority students in Texas and suggested that minority under-
representation in college populations would become a greater problem in the future.  At 
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the time of the Hopwood ruling, minority students were already the main source of new 
students in Texas.  “Ethnic minorities constitute[d] 53.6 percent of all students enrolled in 
elementary and secondary schools in 1995-96 in Texas” (Advisory Committee on Criteria 
for Diversity, 1997, p. II-3).   
Former University of Texas at Austin president Dr. Robert M. Berdahl (1996) 
also expressed his concern over demographic trends.  In a letter in which he shared (with 
state legislators) a copy of an editorial that he wrote for The University of Texas at 
Austin newspaper, The Daily Texan, he stated: 
Demographers reinforce the notion that we must educate more young people to 
fill leadership positions in minority communities.  The population of the United 
States is changing dramatically.  By the year 2020 there will be no majority 
population in America.  Growth in the next 25 years will produce new levels of 
demands for teachers, doctors, reporters—people in all walks of life—with strong 
affinities to the minority communities they serve….A diverse student body has 
come to be thought of as an educational resource as important as the quality of the 
library, the faculty, laboratories, or any other key asset of a university.  We have 
come a long way from the days when governors stood in the doorways blocking 
access to education….We ought not retreat from this progress.  (pp. 2-6)    
When the 75th legislative session convened, key minority legislators sought a 
legislative response to curtail the anticipated adverse effects of the Hopwood ruling.  This 
study shows that the policymaking environment of 1997 responded with a legislative 
solution:  House Bill 588.  Unexpectedly, it turned out to be race-neutral.  The 
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significance of this outcome is noteworthy for several reasons.  First, a new political 
climate, primarily controlled by Republicans, managed to change admissions policies 
with the help of the Hopwood ruling from race-based to race-neutral.  Second, the change 
occurred in only five months—one session.  Third, the Texas Legislature assumed an 
unprecedented role of becoming involved in the details of admissions policies in higher 
education. 
 
Purpose of the Study  
 This case study examined the politics surrounding the development and enactment 
of House Bill 588.  Specifically it used the model of political innovation developed by 
Philip Meranto (1967) to analyze the environmental (societal) and legislative conditions 
that contributed to the drafting, support, and passage of House Bill 588.  Meranto 
combined elements of the systems approach with a legislative model in his effort to 
understand how major legislative innovation occurs in a political system.  He noted that 
the systems approach allows for the study of the authoritative decisions, which result 
from the interrelationship between political actors and institutions.  He added that the 
systems approach provides descriptions of the various parts of the political system, it 
differentiates political interactions from other type of social interactions, and allows for 
consideration of environmental factors, which in an “open” political system can have a 
crucial influence on the interactions within the system.  
Meranto’s (1967) model, which addressed the political system at the societal 
level, was adjusted for this study to fit a political subsystem—the Texas Legislature.  
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Meranto’s conceptual framework was also modified.  This was done to accommodate the 
distinctiveness of this study, which was to identify the environmental (societal) and 
legislative factors that affected the development and enactment of House Bill 588 during 
the 75th Legislature.   
This study provides insight into how the Texas Legislature responded to a public 
policy issue it had not addressed in the past.  It also shows how key legislative 
stakeholders redefined the use of race in college admissions to ensure equitable access to 
higher education for minority students.   
 
Research Questions   
The following questions guided the research of this study: 
RQ #1:   How did members of the Texas Legislature perceive the Hopwood ruling?  
RQ #2:   What influence did the implementation of the Hopwood ruling have on the 
policymaking process of the 75th Legislative Session?  
RQ #3:   What conditions within the Texas Legislature favored the final construction of 
House Bill 588, and what were the final provisions of the legislative policy 
addressing minority representation in higher education? 
RQ #4:   What key strategies did the author of House Bill 588 implement to facilitate the   





Significance of the Study   
Many civil rights lawyers considered the Hopwood case “the most significant 
threat to racial quotas or admission policies since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1978 
on Alan Bakke” (Ackerman, 1994, p. A1).  The Bakke case permitted some forms of 
race-based admissions procedures.  If subsequent court cases eliminated race as a factor 
in an admissions policy, their effect would become a critical point of analysis for policy 
makers.  Texas and other states would have to ask, “How do we maintain diversity in 
higher education in light of Hopwood (and potentially similar decisions)?”  The Texas 
Legislature’s model, House Bill 588, could be used as a policy model because it does not 
use race as an admissions factor while, at the same time, it is intended to maintain 
diversity in Texas colleges and universities.   
This study provides other states and policy analysts two kinds of information:  (a) 
other factors that can be used in place of race in admissions criteria and (b) insight into 
how support was built to enact legislation dealing with the issue of minority under-
representation in higher education. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
While there are some advantages to a qualitative study, such as being able to 
uncover  “the intricate details of phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative 
methods” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 19), this study, like every qualitative case study, 
regardless of how well it is conducted, was subject to a number of limitations.  First, this 
study did not use statistical procedures nor quantitative measures to test its hypotheses 
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(Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).  Second, this case was based primarily on historical evidence, 
which is incapable of relaying “exactly” what happened during the 75th Legislature.  
Third, since information was gathered through interviews, document collection and 
observations, there was a danger that interpretation of this information was subject to 
personal bias.  Bogdan & Biklen recommendation that researchers can “guard against 
their own biases by recording detailed field notes that include reflections on their own 
subjectivity” (p. 46).  Finally, Glesne & Peshkin (1992) noted that because most 
researchers are the main research instruments, in that they gather the data and interact 
with research participants, it is important that researchers focus on being objective 
throughout the research process.  They advise that “[i]n qualitative research, the 
researcher’s role is to observe and measure, and care is taken to keep the researcher from 
‘contaminating’ the data through personal involvement with the research subjects.  
Researcher ‘objectivity’ is of utmost concern” (p. 6).  
 
Organization of the Study 
The study consists of five chapters.  This first chapter provides an introduction to 
the study.  It also states the problem and the purpose of the study, and lists the questions 
guiding the research study.  This is followed by a description of the significance, 
limitations and organization of the study.  Chapter II presents a review of the literature, 
including:  (1) an introduction to the review of the literature; (2) a summary of Meranto’s 
(1967) systems approach model to political innovation; (3) a review of the conceptual 
framework guiding the collection, organization and analysis of the data in this study; and 
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(4) an examination of the “Conditions Outside the Texas Legislature” such as the 
environmental influences and major demand articulators.  Chapter III outlines the 
methodology of the study.  Chapter IV details the internal conditions of the 75th 
Legislature, its response to external influences, and the outcomes of the legislative 
process.  Chapter V presents a summary of the key findings, interpretation of the 



















  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter will present a review of the literature related to legislative and 
interest group behavior.  Particular attention will be given to Meranto’s (1967) model, 
which examines the societal and legislative conditions that influence innovative 
legislative change.  In addition, the chapter will review two courts decisions related to the 
Hopwood case and subsequent interpretations by the Attorney General of the State of 
Texas.  It will also summarize the literature specific to the demographic changes in 
Texas. 
The review begins with an overview of the systems approach to political 
innovation, which is the basis of the model constructed by Meranto (1967).  Meranto 
incorporated the systems approach and a legislative model into a conceptual framework 
for his “Model of Legislative Change.”  The basic assumption of the model is that new 
inputs (environmental changes) create input demands and influence the interactions 
within the legislative system.  The result is new outputs (new legislation) that emerge 
from these interactions.   
To accommodate this study, Meranto’s (1967) model is adjusted from its intended 
purpose to study the reversal of a position on a long-standing federal legislative issue to a 
model that examines the immediate conditions that affected the enactment of state 
legislation, at a specific time.  In other words, this study differs from Meranto’s in its 
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timeframe and level of government.  This study, however, follows Mererato’s general 
design—to identify the societal influences and legislative influences3 on a policy issue.  It 
is important to note that the focus of this chapter is on the first part of Meranto’s model, 
which in this study is termed  “Conditions Outside the Texas Legislature.”  These are the 
societal influences on the system, which include:  (1) the “Environmental Influences” that 
place input demands on the system, and (2) the “Major Demand Articulators” that 
Meranto has identified as the groups or individuals who provide legislators with 
legislative input.  
Background on the model guiding this study—a systems model—is presented 
first. 
 
A Systems Model 
In attempting to understand how major legislative innovation occurs in political 
systems,  Meranto (1967) failed to find an existing model that would take into account 
the influences of the policymaking process.4  What he found examined the process in 
which a bill becomes a law or focused on conflict adjustment and consensus building.  
Not having found a model specifically aimed on what influences major political change 
at the legislative level, Meranto created his own model using the systems approach to 
                                                 
3 The legislative influences on a policy issue are those factors “within” the legislative system, the Texas 
Legislature in this case.  These influences, and their affect on the new output, will be identified and 
discussed in chapter IV.   
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4 Meranto (1967) wanted to understand how major innovation occurs, in particular he wanted to know 
about the politics surrounding the enactment of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965.  He was interested in knowing why previous attempts to enact such legislation had failed, and what 
social and political changes attributed to the success of this Act.       
political change.  To explain how major legislative innovation occurs, he “combine[d] 
elements of the systems approach to political behavior at the societal level, as developed 
by such theorists as David Easton and William Mitchell, with aspects of a legislative 
model constructed by John C. Wahlke and his colleagues” (p. 7). 
David Easton (1965) states that a system is:  
any set of variables regardless of the degree of interrelationships among them…. 
[A] political system can be designated as those interactions through which values 
are authoritatively allocated for a society; this is what distinguishes a political 
system from other systems that may be interpreted as lying in its environment.  (p. 
21) 
Meranto (1967) points out that a political system focuses on the interrelationships among 
political actors and institutions that produce authoritative decisions regarding competing 
political goals and determine which ones become law.  Analysis of a political system and 
how authoritative decisions are made is particularly important to this study to better 
understand the development and enactment of House Bill 588.  Easton (1957) suggests 
that:  
We can try to understand political life by viewing each of its aspects piecemeal.  
We can examine the operation of such institutions as political parties, interest 
groups, government, and voting; we can study the nature and consequences of 
such political practices as manipulation, propaganda, and violence; we can seek to 
reveal the structure within which these practices occur.  By combining the results 
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we can obtain a rough picture of what happens in any self-contained political unit.  
(p. 383)   
The reasons vary as to why some demands are transformed into issues on political 
agendas and others are not.  Easton (1957) states that:  
The distinction between demands and issues raises a number of questions about 
which we need data if we are to understand the processes through which claims 
typically become transformed into issues.  For example, we would need to know 
something about the relationship between a demand and the location of its 
initiators or supporters in the power structures of the society, the importance of 
secrecy as compared with publicity in presenting demands, the matter of timing of 
demands, the possession of political skills or know-how, access to channels of 
communication, the attitudes and states of mind of possible publics, and the 
images held by the initiators of demands with regard to the way in which things 
get done in the particular political system.  (p. 389) 
Meranto (1967) notes that groups utilize their resources to bring attention to a particular 
social condition that they view as problematic.  He says that if they are able to identify 
their issue as a “crisis,” they are more likely to succeed in their goal.         
Conceptual Framework 
Meranto’s (1967) model was used in the collection, organization, and analysis of 
the data in this study.  Meranto adjusted a political systems framework from the societal 
level to the national legislative level.  He did this by “reducing the unit of analysis from 
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the total societal political system to a subpolitical system” (pp. 9-10).   In this study, a 
similar subpolitical system will be the focus of analysis, the Texas Legislature.   
In an attempt to clarify the conceptual framework guiding this study, a 
comparative summary of Meranto’s (1967) “Model of Legislative Change” and this 
study’s “Model of Legislative Policymaking” is presented below.   
A Model of Legislative Change:  Meranto’s (1967) model identifies the changes in 
the environment that have a direct impact on new policy outputs, as well as possible 
changes from within the system itself.  In his study, Meranto (1967) explains that the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965:      
was the result of a mixture of past and immediate changes, both in the 
environment and within the political system, which came together in a unique 
grouping capable of generating a new major public policy that had long been 
blocked by a variety of factors.  The variables in both categories, the environment 
and the political system itself, which appear to hold the most promise for 
explaining the nature of the changes and how they contributed to the output under 
consideration.  (p. 10) 
 More specifically, the first major category of Meranto’s (1967) model calls for the 
examination of the external influences that create input demands, which he terms 
“Environmental Changes.”  His environmental changes are composed of two 
subcategories:  (1) circumstantial conditions, and (2) major demand articulators.  The 
circumstantial conditions refer to unexpected environmental changes that may have an 
affect on the policymaking process.  Some conditions that may characterize the 
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environment include periods of economic instability or various social changes.  Meranto 
also notes that a legislator can be personally influenced by the circumstantial conditions 
in the environment.  He says that the circumstantial conditions can have a direct impact 
on legislators who perceive their effect.  The major demand articulators include those 
actors who “have an influential impact on the nature of interaction within the legislative 
system and the kinds of outputs that emerge from it” (p. 11).  These can include interest 
groups, constituents, and political parties.  
The second major category of the model calls for an examination of the internal 
influences that affect the new output, which Meranto (1967) calls “Changes Within the 
Legislative System.”  These will to be discussed further in chapter IV. 
A Model of Legislative Policymaking:  As previously mentioned, Meranto’s 
(1967) model has been modified to accommodate the purpose of this study.  First, the two 
major categories are renamed:  (1) from “Environmental Changes” to “Conditions 
Outside the Texas Legislature,” and (2) from “Changes Within the Legislative System” to 
“Conditions Within the Texas Legislature.”  Second, one subcategory is renamed—
“Circumstantial Conditions” is changed to “Environmental Influences.”  Both models 
retain the name of the other subcategory entitled “Major Demand Articulators.”   
This model allows for three primary environmental influences outside the Texas 
Legislature that created input demands on the system.  The two unexpected changes in 
the environment included the Hopwood case and the former Texas Attorney General’s 
interpretation of Hopwood.  The third environmental influence was the projected 
demographic changes in Texas.  Because these three societal conditions were perceived 
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as affecting minority representation in higher education, they became input demands on 
the legislative system via legislators themselves.  The model also identifies four major 
demand articulators:  interest groups, private citizens/constituents, state agency 
legislative liaisons, and political parties.  
In sum, this chapter will show how the inputs, by way of demands (i.e., social, 
legal and demographic), were placed onto the legislative system.  How the efforts by 
minority legislators seeking a response to the Hopwood ruling were converted by the 
processes of the system into an output will be examined in chapter IV.   
 
Conditions Outside the Texas Legislature  
Environmental Influences 
Meranto (1967) states that the openness of a legislative system allows it to be 
responsive to environmental changes.  The environmental conditions are then “converted 
to political demands either by members within the system or by demand articulators” (p. 
13).  He explains that individuals or groups who perceive a specific societal problem 
utilize their political resources to seek governmental redress. 
During the 75th Legislature, minority legislators and various education groups 
perceived the Hopwood ruling and Attorney General Dan Morales’ subsequent 
interpretation of it as threats to minority representation in higher education, a situation 
which was made even more significant by the projected demographic changes in the 
State.  As a proactive measure, they sought a legislative solution.  Later in this chapter is 
a review of the three environmental influences on the Texas legislative system in 1997:  
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(1) the Hopwood case, (2) the former Texas Attorney General’s interpretation of 
Hopwood, and (3) the projected demographic changes in the State of Texas.  First, 
however, an overview of the admissions process (the basis of the lawsuit) is presented as 
background information.     
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 at 557 (W.D. Tex. 1994) described 
the admissions process at The University of Texas School of Law as becoming 
increasingly complicated.  In the early 1960’s it was fairly easy to get admitted into the 
law school.  But, as the number of applicants exceeded the school’s capacity, a more 
selective process was established.  Admissions became based on a number of factors, 
including the Texas Index (TI) number, which is a score calculated by using an 
applicant’s undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and the Law School Aptitude Test 
(LSAT) score.  By the 1992 school year, the law school was placing applicants into one 
of three categories based on their TI scores:  (1) presumptive admit, (2) presumptive 
deny, or (3) discretionary zone.  Applicants in the presumptive admit or in the 
presumptive deny groups received little review.  The discretionary zone applicants 
received a more thorough review.  Non-minority applicants with a TI score of 199 were 
placed in the presumptive admit groups.  Minority applicants, in contrast, needed only a 
189 TI score to be presumptively admitted.  The presumptive deny score was 192 for 
non-minorities and 179 for minorities.  See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-36.  The standards 
were designed “to meet an ‘aspiration’ of admitting a class consisting of 10% Mexican 
Americans and 5% blacks, proportions roughly comparable to the percentages of those 
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races graduating from Texas colleges.”  See id. at 937.  Additionally, the University had 
created a separate committee to review minority applicants in which:  
black and Mexican American applicants’ files were reviewed by a minority 
subcommittee of three, which would meet and discuss every minority candidate.  
Thus, each of these candidates’ files could get extensive review and discussion.  
And while the minority subcommittee reported summaries of files to the 
admissions committee as a whole, the minority subcommittee’s decisions were 
“virtually final.”  See id. at 937         
The two different policies—“separate zones of scores and separate committeesare the 
two specific parts of the admissions procedure that have received strong criticism and 
were the basis for both the [U.S.] District Court and the Court of Appeals decision” 
(Kauffman & Gonzalez, 1997, pp. 233-234).  
The Hopwood Case 
September 29, 1992:  After four White students applied for admission to The 
University of Texas School of Law and were rejected, they filed suit against the 
University.  They contended that the law school’s affirmative action admissions program 
had discriminated against them and favored less qualified Black and Hispanic applicants 
through the use of a separate subcommittee. The plaintiffs included:  Cheryl J. Hopwood, 
Douglas W. Carvell, Kenneth R. Elliott, and David A. Rogers (Morales, no date). 
 
August 19, 1994:  Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994) 
was tried before the United States District Court in Austin, Texas.  U.S. District Judge 
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Sam Sparks ruled that in 1992 The University of Texas at Austin unconstitutionally 
discriminated against the plaintiffs because it separately evaluated White and minority 
law school applicants.  However, he did not order the law school to admit them since no 
injury was done to the applicants (Ackerman, 1994).  In its conclusion, the Court stated:    
It is regrettable that affirmative action programs are still needed in our society.  
However, until society sufficiently overcomes the effects of its lengthy history of 
pervasive racism, affirmative action is a necessity….Commitment to affirmative 
action programs in educational institutions as just and necessary, however, does 
not imply that the individual rights of nonminorities should fall by the wayside or 
be ignored….Only by applying strict scrutiny can the judicial branch assure 
society that the important individual rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment have not been unnecessarily and unfairly burdened solely as a 
function of the color of an individual’s skin.….The Court believes the only way 
of assuring an undue burden is not placed on innocent parties in an admissions 
procedure is to treat all applicants as individuals and to consider all qualifications 
in selecting the best qualified candidates to comprise an entering class.  See 
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551 at 583-84.  
When Judge Sparks issued his decision, he stated that because the plaintiffs were 
denied their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal treatment, they could reapply for 
admission to the law school without paying the application fees.  Each plaintiff was also 
awarded one dollar compensation for being denied equal treatment (Graves, 1994, pp. 
A1, A12).  In summary, “[t]he district court denied the plaintiffs’ requests for punitive 
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damages, compensatory damages, and an order of admission to law school. The plaintiffs 
appealed” (Kauffman & Gonzalez, 1997, p. 237).  
March 18, 1996:  The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
results of the 1994 trial.  The three-judge panel “called on UT officials to overhaul the 
law school admissions policy so that race is no longer considered except under very 
narrow circumstances” (Stutz, 1996a, pp. A1, A17).  The Court said that the law school 
presented no compelling evidence to justify the elevation of some races over others, 
“even for the wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial imbalance in the student 
body.”  See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.  The Appeals Court ordered the District Court to 
reconsider the case, including damages and the students’ admittance into law school 
(Stutz, 1996a).    
In the discussion of its opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court rejected Justice Powell’s 
diversity rationale in Bakke.  It argued that Bakke had no binding precedent on the 
Hopwood case since the diversity rationale is mentioned only in Justice Powell’s opinion.  
See id. at 944.  “In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than 
Justice Powell’s lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state’s interest in diversity constitutes a 
compelling justification for governmental race-based discrimination.”  See id. at 945.   
On the matter of present effects of past discrimination, the Fifth Circuit Court 
emphasized that: 
By the late 1960’s, the school [University of Texas School of Law] had 
implemented its first program designed to recruit minorities…and it now engages 
in an extensive minority recruiting program that includes a significant amount of 
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scholarship money.  The vast majority of the faculty, staff, and students at the law 
school had absolutely nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school 
practiced in the past.  In such a case, one cannot conclude that a hostile 
environment is the present effect of past discrimination.  Any racial tension at the 
law school is most certainly the result of present societal discrimination and, if 
anything, is contributed to, rather than alleviated by, the overt and prevalent 
consideration of race in admissions.  See id. at 953. 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit Court rejected using the history of discrimination in Texas 
public schools to support the admissions policy under review.  Though it acknowledged 
Texas’ history of racial discrimination in its public schools, it held that “the law school 
has no comparative advantage in measuring the present effects of discrimination in 
primary and secondary schools in Texas.”  See id. at 951.  Instead, the judges suggested 
that it would be more proper for the State of Texas, through the legislature, to find the 
present effects of past segregation.  In summary, the Court ruled that race could not be 
used as a factor in the law school’s admission criteria to achieve diversity, combat a 
hostile environment, alleviate its poor reputation, or eliminate present effects of past 
discrimination by anyone else other than the law school.  See id. at 962.       
When the Fifth Circuit Court overruled the District Court’s ruling on The 
University of Texas School of Law’s affirmative action admission policy, the State of 
Texas began entertaining three ways in which to respond:  (1) appeal to the Fifth Circuit 
Court to rehear its contention; (2) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court; or (3) forgo an 
appeal (Gonzalez, 1996).  Attorney General Morales’ initial response was to forgo an 
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appeal, stating that some civil-rights experts “are not comfortable that this is one of the 
stronger cases with which to present the U.S. Supreme Court with the issue of affirmative 
action and higher education” (Gonzalez, 1996, p. A1).  Morales also cautioned about the 
national implications that the case could have.  He said, “I think that it would be 
irresponsible for us to attempt to deal with this case on the assumption that it was only 
going to impact on the University of Texas or on the states of the 5th Circuit” (Gonzalez, 
1996, p. A1).  
Morales finally decided that Texas would appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.  He 
stated, “[w]e have found ourselves in a situation where I think the harmful consequences 
of this ruling, if allowed to stand upon our state and upon higher education, compel the 
action that we have decided upon” (Scott, 1996a, p. A7).  He also said that, “it is 
important to preserve some type of formal affirmative action program” (Walt, 1996, pp. 
A1, A10).  Additionally, Morales sought a stay from the Fifth Circuit Court to 
temporarily suspend its ruling (Stutz, 1996c, pp. A17, A28).  The stay was granted 
allowing “universities in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi to reinstate those programs 
while they wait for the U.S. Supreme Court to act on an appeal Texas is preparing” 
(Roser, 1996, pp. A1, A7).                    
April 30, 1996:  Morales filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court, 
challenging the federal ruling that struck down race-based admissions procedures at The 
University of Texas School of Law (Stutz, 1996d).  After filing the appeal, Morales’ 
made comments that angered minority activists.  He stated: 
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The time has come to chart a new course to ensure equal treatment and 
inclusiveness in the admissions process….We will never overcome past 
discrimination by practicing discrimination today….It is simply wrong to give 
one applicant an automatic advantage over another applicant, based solely upon 
the color of one’s skin.  It was wrong 50 years ago, and it is wrong today.  (Scott, 
1996b, p. A1) 
Al Kauffman, the lead attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense Education 
Fund, noted that Morales’ comments “imply that minority students and employees are 
less qualified and none of those things are true.  His statement is inconsistent with the 
state’s position in the litigation and could hurt the state’s chances on appeal” (Scott, 
1996b, p. A1).  
July 1, 1996:  The Supreme Court issued its decision.  It voted to leave intact the 
Fifth Circuit Court’s ruling striking down race-based admissions policies at the law 
school.  The Court said that it would not review a policy that was no longer in effect 
(Scott & Calderon, 1996).  
Attorney General Morales’ Interpretation of Hopwood 
     On August 21, 1996, Attorney General Dan Morales issued guidelines for race-
neutral admissions policies, including financial aid decisions (Morales, 1996b).  In this 
interpretation5 of the 1996 ruling, Morales stated that the Hopwood decision applied to all 
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5  Attorney General Morales said that he sent out a letter because he had received calls from many general 
counsel and other university administrators inquiring about the Supreme Court’s denial and what this meant 
regarding the use of affirmative action in Texas.  Morales’ letter provided general guiding principles and 
the rationale for his interpretation.  He suggested that institutions consult with their own lawyers in 
applying these principles (Morales, 1996a). 
admissions and financial aid decisions in all state colleges and universities, not just the 
law school that was the subject of the lawsuit.  In his letter, Morales encouraged 
universities to pursue diversity in other ways (Morales, 1996a). Morales further cautioned 
that “[d]oing otherwise could expose institutions and individuals alike to potential 
liability for actual and punitive damages” (Morales, 1996a, p. 7).  Additionally, Morales 
(1996a) justified the inclusion of financial aid decisions in race-neutral policies as 
follows:      
I include financial aid decisions because the justification for race based financial 
aid is the same as for affirmative action programs: diversity and the eradication of 
present effects of past discrimination.  Hopwood expressly eliminates diversity as 
a justification for racial classifications.  As to the present effects justification, 
Hopwood and Podberesky, on which the Hopwood Court relies, make it almost 
impossible to prove present effects of past discrimination.  (p. 7) 
At the beginning of his letter, Morales clarified that the “Supreme Court’s denial 
of our petition neither affirmed nor reversed the Fifth Circuit Court’s Hopwood decision” 
(Morales, 1996a, p. 1).  He stated that the Court simply decided not to consider the case 
because the University’s admissions program in dispute was no longer used and clarified 
that the Fifth Circuit Court’s Hopwood decision was the law only in the Court’s 
jurisdiction, which included Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.  All other states in the 






 Review of documents from the 1997 legislative session revealed extensive 
discussions about projected population changes in the State of Texas.  Central to those 
discussions was the burgeoning growth of Texas’ minority populations at the time the 
Hopwood case banned the affirmative action programs at The University of Texas School 
of Law.  Those discussions demonstrated the importance of demographic changes for the 
policymaking process.  The demographic changes were best described by Dr. Steve 
Murdock, chief demographer of the Texas State Data Center at Texas A&M University, 
and his colleagues.  Murdock, Hoque, Michael, White, and Pecotte (1995) projected that: 
The population would become less than one-half Anglo by 2008 and, by 2030, the 
proportion of the population that is Anglo would be only 36.7 percent while the 
Hispanic population would account for 45.9 percent, the Black population for 9.5 
percent, and the Other population for 7.9 percent of the total population of Texas. 
(p. 5)    
The educational effects were more staggering.  In their report, The Texas Challenge, 
Murdock, Hoque, Michael, White, and Pecotte (1999) and his colleagues noted that:  
Minority students would account for all of the net increase in the number of 
elementary and secondary and college students from 1990 to 2030 (because of the 
number of Anglos would show an absolute numerical decline).  It is apparent that 
the future of Texas education will be closely tied to its minority students.  (p. 157) 
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The report also mentioned that the effect of minority growth would depend on 
whether or not minorities become full participants in the Texas economy.  The report 
stated:  
if minorities ‘catch up’ with Anglos, the result will be increased wealth for Texas, 
reduced public service demands, and increased tax revenue.  If minorities do not 
obtain greater equity, Texas could become a society with increased 
socioeconomic inequity, a pattern also occurring in other parts of the United 
States.  (Karoly, 1992, cited in Murdock et al., 1999, p. 221-222)   
An editorial in the Austin American-Statesman also expressed concern about the 
potential negative effect of the demographic trends, noting that: 
Hispanics are expected to be the majority of Texas residents in the next decade, 
yet are underrepresented as students and faculty members in state colleges and 
universities….[T]he state’s economic and social well-being will be jeopardized if 
the majority of its residents do not receive the education necessary to assume 
professional and leadership roles in the future.  (“Bills counter,” 1997, p. A12) 
  Interestingly, the demographic implications had a significant impact on 
Republican State Senator Bivins, Chairman of the Senate Education Committee.  In fact, 
it was Murdock’s work that motivated the Senator to later co-sponsor legislation with 
minority legislators to ensure diversity in higher education.  In an interview he stated, “I 
was more motivated because of Murdock’s work than I was Hopwood.  On the other end, 
I would lie to you if I said that Hopwood was not a catalyst.” 
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Major Demand Articulators  
There are four groups identified in this study as major demand articulators that 
provided legislators with input.  These external influences came from:  interest groups, 
private citizens/constituents, state agency legislative liaisons and political parties. 
Interest Groups  
In his work The Governmental Process, David Truman (1951), defined an interest 
group as any group with “shared attitudes” that makes a demand on society.  He stated 
that a group making a demand on an institution of government would be considered a 
political interest group.  Greenwald (1977) says that interest groups are organized bodies 
of individuals with shared attitudes who come together to further their common goals.  
He adds that groups also develop when they feel victimized by circumstances affecting 
their social status or their pocketbook.  Truman (1951) further suggests that interest 
groups arise when the system has been disturbed by a major societal change. 
Lobbyists are the agents and lobbying is the activity through which interest 
groups transmit their concerns and demands to the participants in the public policy 
process (Greenwald, 1977).  In the quest for a natural sense of balance, it is to be 
expected that, when a push comes in one direction of an issue, a push in the opposite 
direction is likely to follow (Milbrath, 1970).  “When groups push on both sides of an 
issue, officials can more freely exercise their judgment than when the groups push on 
only one side” (Milbrath, 1970, p. 419).   
Cole and Taebel (1987) found that the power of interest groups largely depends 
on the following: 
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1.  size—elected officials are likely to be sympathetic to the needs of the larger 
interest groups with the more potential voters; 
2.  internal cohesion—members of groups with the same values are more effective in 
attaining their goals, especially if there is strong agreement on a policy matter;  
3.  money—having financial resources allows interest groups to hire effective 
lobbying staff, and the groups are able to contribute money to the candidate 
through their own political action committees; and 
4.  expertise—legislators are known to defer to groups with a great deal of 
knowledge when dealing with more technical issues.  
Cole and Taebel add that electioneering is another method interest groups use to 
influence the policy-making process.  This type of influence is exerted through voter 
organization, campaign contributions, and candidate recruitment.  Larger interest groups 
are more likely to be involved in electioneering.  Through this type of influence, interest 
groups seek legislative understanding of their side of issues.  A final means of impacting 
the political process is litigation, though often used only as a last resort, they said.  
Private Citizens/Constituents 
Blair (1967) says that constituents are a source of legislative initiation too.  Either 
acting alone or in groups, individuals petition representatives to support legislation.   
Relating to who influences a legislator’s voting behavior, Keefe, Abraham, 
Flanigan, Jones, Ogul, and Spanier (1986) listed the following in order of most influence 
to least influence:  other legislative members, constituents, interest groups and 
administration.  Other influences identified included party leadership, staff and reading.  
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Keefe et al. said that legislators seek the advice of colleagues they trust primarily when 
time is limited, the issues are complex or when there is some political risk.  However, a 
legislator’s constituency is a close second; and the more pressure from the district, the 
greater the influence.  Turner and Schneier (1970) found that constituent influence is 
more ambiguous, particularly when comparing it to the influence of political parties.  
Turner and Schneier identified four general constituency characteristics to help determine 
differences in voting behavior.  The four are race, region, ethnic associations, and degree 
of urbanization.              
State Agency Legislative Liaisons 
Kraemer, Newell, and Prindle (1996), in their study of the Texas Legislature, are 
among the few authors to acknowledge the involvement of state bureaucrats and state 
agencies in the policymaking process.  Their study refers to individuals working for a 
state agency as “state agency legislative liaisons.”  In Texas, they act as the legislative 
liaisons between state agencies and the legislative process.  Kraemer et al. said that the 
primary function of state bureaucrats is the execution of the laws of Texas.  “In carrying 
out this task, however, they have considerable administrative discretion; that is, they are 
relatively free to use their own judgement as to just how the laws will be carried out” (p. 
302).  For this reason, individuals working for state entities are sometimes called to aid 
the lawmakers, especially when proposed legislation will have a direct impact on the 
work of a state agency.  These liaisons present their professional views mostly by 
furnishing specialized information to legislators and by helping to draft bills.  
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Political Parties 
 Kraemer et al. (1996) note that the purpose of political parties is to win elections 
so that they can control the output of public policy.  Keefe et al. (1986) add that a 
political party’s aim is to control government so that it can make policies that favor the 
interests of its supporters and the party’s own interests.  They caution that when both 
chambers (House and Senate) are not controlled by the same party, “conflict is 
heightened and deadlocks are common” (p. 220).  In such situations, success comes with 
the ability to forge bipartisan coalitions. 
Kraemer et al. (1996) state that the source of party conflict is usually ideology.  
They describe ideology as “a system of beliefs and values about the nature of the good 
life in the good society, about the relationship of government and the economy, about 
moral values and the way they should be achieved, and about how government is to 
conduct itself” (p. 132). 
  Keefe et al. (1986) define a liberal ideology as supporting government policies 
that promote welfare and regulate business, whereas a conservative ideology would 
oppose such involvement, as well as oppose government regulation over business.    
Kraemer et al. (1996) explain that:    
Ideology is one of the most important bases for political parties everywhere, but 
in Texas, where parties have historically been weak, ideology has usually been 
more important than party affiliation.  The major ideological conflict has been 
between conservatives and liberals.  (p. 159) 
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 Davidson’s (1969) research findings indicate that a legislator’s likelihood of 
being influenced by a political party or interest group depends on numerous factors.  
Though generalizing, he states that:    
Those members who are most favorably oriented toward parties and groups—
low-seniority and electorally vulnerable members, for example—are apparently 
more dependent upon these organizations for the cues they need.  Members less 
in need of these commodities are less favorably disposed toward parties and 
interest groups.  (p.174) 
However, Davidson (1969) adds two caveats.  He says that:  
First, leaders are more party-oriented than nonleaders, despite the fact that their 
high seniority and relative electoral safety might otherwise foster independence 
from partisan claims.  Secondly, party affiliation itself seems to exert an 
independent impact upon party and interest-group roles, Republicans showing 
themselves slightly more proparty and progroup than Democrats.  This variation 
may be the result of different kinds of constituencies, or of divergent patterns of 
intra-House socialization.  (pp.174-175)      
When it comes to casting a vote, Turner and Schneier (1970) found that:     
Some independent members vote their convictions in spite of what they perceive 
to be the demands placed upon them; and in many cases other variables—such as 
personal commitments to other members, relations with interest groups, or 
committee membership—are controlling.  Nevertheless, the great majority of 
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congressmen are interested in re-election, and roll-call votes frequently are 
important in re-election campaigns.  (p. 10)   
Thus, Turner and Schneier state that, more often than not, a legislators’ voting behavior 
reflects the influence of fellow party members in their district.  
Because of the difficulty in actually assessing the full extent of a political party’s 
influence on a legislative vote, Meranto (1967) notes that political scientists depend on 
roll-call analysis because this method provides the degree to which legislators of the 
same party vote together on a specific issue.  Regarding congressional voting behavior, 
Turner and Schneier (1970) state that the roll-call vote: 
accurately reflects the effectiveness of the various pressures brought to bear on 
each congressman, particularly with regard to issues which are so important or 




In summary, Meranto’s (1967) model that combines the systems approach and  a 
legislative model provided the essential guide in examining how major innovation occurs 
at the legislative level.  To accommodate this particular case study, Meranto’s model was 
modified to examine the major conditions outside the Texas Legislature that had a direct 
influence on the outcome of House Bill 588, as well as the primary conditions within the 
legislature that also affected the bill.  How the above two factors are related to one 
another will be analyzed in chapter IV.  
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Research points to the appropriateness of the use of qualitative studies to uncover 
and understand any phenomenon about which little is known (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
A natural history approach allows the author to “dramatically portray a sense of people 
and place and their interactions with the researcher” (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p. 163).  
Going to the place where the actual events occurred and talking to the people involved in 
the process were especially helpful in gaining the needed in-depth understanding of how 
the Texas Legislature responded to the demands of minority legislators and interest 
groups to maintain diversity in the State’s colleges and universities.  The study examined 
the politics surrounding the development and enactment of House Bill 588 during the 75th 
Texas Legislature. This qualitative inquiry took the form of a single case study.   
Case studies are beneficial when conducting a detailed examination of a setting, a 
single subject, or a particular event (Merriam, 1988, cited in Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).  
“[C]ase-oriented methods often stimulate the development of new substantive theories” 
(Ragin, 1987, p. 44).  A case study of organizational decision making is critical to the 
understanding of organizational behavior and the theoretical aspects of that behavior 
(George & McKeown, 1985).    
The use of qualitative research in a case study generates what is often referred to 
as “soft” data, but this data is “rich in description of people, places, and conversations” 
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(Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p. 2).   Unlike a quantitative study, a qualitative case study is 
evolutionary in its design, interview questions and interpretations, thus it is susceptible to 
change along the way (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992).  Glesne and Peshkin (1992) suggest that 
the openness of a qualitative research design allows: 
the researcher to approach the inherent complexity of social interaction and to do 
justice to that complexity, to respect it in its own right.  Qualitative researchers 
avoid simplifying social phenomena and instead explore the range of behavior 
and expand their understanding of the resulting interactions.  Throughout the 
research process, they assume that social interaction is complex and that they will 
uncover some of that complexity.  (p. 7) 
Due to the complexity and evolving process of this qualitative research, the data 
collection and data analysis occurred simultaneously.  This allowed the study to take 
shape as it proceeded.  Glesne and Peshkin (1992) recommend that the researcher:  
Consistently reflect on your data, work to organize them, and try to discover what 
they have to tell you.  Writing memos to yourself, developing analytic files, 
applying rudimentary coding schemes, and writing monthly reports will help you 
learn from and manage the information you are receiving.  (pp. 127-128) 
 
The Setting 
The setting for this study was the Texas Legislature in Austin, Texas in 1997.  
The Legislature’s primary functions are to represent the people of Texas, enact laws, and 
investigate and administer oversight to ensure sound public policy.  In the process of 
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lawmaking, legislators help shape the political agenda for Texas.  They determine how 
the State appropriates its funds and make decisions affecting major State issues.   The 
biennial legislative sessions are held every odd-numbered year for 140 days, beginning 
the second Tuesday in January (Kraemer et al., 1996). 
The Texas Legislature is made up of 150 members in the House of 
Representatives and 31 members in the Senate.  State representatives are elected to serve 
two-year terms and in 1997 likely represented a constituency of approximately 114,000 
residents.  Senators serve four-year terms, and during the 75th Legislature represented a 
population of about 552,000 (Texas Legislative Council, 1990).   
Since Texas has become a two-party state, Democratic and Republican, political 
party affiliation and party organization have grown in importance (Harmel & Hamm cited 
in Kraemer et al., 1996, p. 212).  Historically, Texas has been a one-party state:  
Democratic.  Within the last 20 years, however, Republican representation in the 
legislature has tripled.  In 1989 Republicans in the Texas House formed a formal caucus 
(Kraemer et al., 1996).  Numerous other caucuses exist today based on party, ideology 
and ethnicity, including the Mexican American Legislative Caucus and the Texas 
Legislative Black Caucus in the House of Representatives, and the Senate Hispanic 
Caucus.   
While ethnic minority groups play an important role in politics, they are 
underrepresented in the Texas Legislature.  Although in 1995 more than 37 percent of the 
Texas population was minority, the legislative membership was less than 28 percent 
minority (Kraemer et al., 1996).  In 1997, the House was composed of 108 Anglo 
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legislators, 28 Hispanics, and 14 African-Americans.  In the Senate, 22 were Anglo, 7 
were Mexican-American, and 2 were African-American (Texas House Directory, 1997).   
During the 75th Legislature, the presiding officer in the Senate was Lieutenant 
Governor Bob Bullock.  The lieutenant governor is elected by the people of Texas to 
serve a four-year term.  The Texas Constitution names the lieutenant governor as the 
President of the Senate and gives the Senate the authority to write its own rules.  The 
rules that are adopted by the majority of the senators determine how the Senate will 
conduct its business during the session and how much power the lieutenant governor can 
wield.  Current rules give the lieutenant governor a great deal of influence in shaping 
State policy.  For instance, the rules allow the lieutenant governor to decide all 
parliamentary questions and to use his discretion regarding Senate procedural rules.  The 
rules also allow him to set the bills in any order and to appoint committee chairpersons 
and committee members to study legislation in detail (Texas State Senate, 2003).  
The presiding officer of the House was Speaker James E. “Pete” Laney.  The 
Texas Constitution requires that at the beginning of each legislative session the House 
legislators elect one of its members to serve as Speaker.  The Speaker’s duties include:  
maintaining order during floor debates, recognizing legislators who wish to speak during 
floor proceedings, and ruling on procedural matters.  His other duties are spelled out in 
the House Rules of Procedures, which are adopted by a majority of the House members at 
the start of each session.  The Speaker is given the authority to make committee 
assignments, including naming of committee chairs and vice chairs.  He also has the 
responsibility of referring all legislative bills to a committee, can appoint conference 
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committees and select committees, and can charge committees to conduct interim studies 
(Texas House of Representatives, 2003). 
 
The Subjects 
The subjects for this study were composed of three groups: (1) the 150 state 
representatives and the 31 state senators who served during the 75th Legislative Session in 
1997; (2) the individuals who were identified as the “key legislative stakeholders” in the 
policymaking process, and (3) the major demand articulators who provided legislative 
input to legislators.  The first group of subjects, primarily the House members,6 provided 
relevant information needed to develop various tables identifying the demographic 
characteristics of legislators that may have had an impact on their votes.  The 
characteristics compared include:  political affiliation, composition of legislative district, 
tenure, gender, ethnicity, and membership in one of the two minority legislative caucuses.  
This information was gathered from legislative documents; therefore, questionnaires or 
interviews were not necessary in gathering this specific data.  The data were then 
compared to legislator’s voting records to determine whether or not there was a 
relationship between the characteristics listed above and legislators’ voting preferences.   
Key legislative stakeholders were interviewed to obtain their own insights into the 
actual events.  Major demand articulators provided the list of demands (or “legislative 
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6 Since most of the Senate members voted for House Bill 588, a comparative analysis between the various 
demographic characteristics and their vote was not necessary.  
inputs” for the purposes of this study) placed on legislators.  For this third group, 
information was gathered primarily from legislative documents and interviews.   
        
Data Collection, Instruments and Data Analysis 
This study depended on various methods of gathering data to increase confidence 
in the research findings.  According to Glesne and Peshkin (1992), the three dominant 
types of qualitative inquiry include:  participant observation, interviewing, and document 
collection.  This study incorporated all three of these methods of gathering data.  
Observation of legislative sessions was not all “live,” but rather depended on video and 
audio taping of major legislative events (e.g., committee hearings and House and Senate 
floor debates).  
Document collection included primary and secondary historical sources.  Among 
the primary sources examined were transcripts of the legislative proceedings during the 
regular session of the 75th Legislature as they are recorded in the House Journal and 
Senate Journal, copies of the various versions of House Bill 588, and additional bills 
intended to address other effects of the Hopwood decision.  Committee reports, 
transcripts and official statements of various interest groups and individuals were also 
reviewed.  Video and tape recordings of the House and Senate proceedings were 
examined, as well as various other pertinent documents associated with the passage of 
House Bill 588.  Secondary resources included articles from various newspapers 
throughout the State, and some national and state magazine articles.                    
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The main method for collecting information about the events and key 
stakeholders leading the enactment of House Bill 588 was interviews. Interviews were 
divided into two groups:  informants and participants.  Informants were those who helped 
identify additional data sources and provided information about pertinent history.  These 
were witnesses to the process, such as legislative assistants and committee staff.  
Participants were those who were part of the process that created House Bill 588, those 
whose input was required to implement the legislation, and those who were key 
stakeholders in the decision-making process.  Participants contributed in two ways to the 
study, first by providing names, and second by offering their own insights into the actual 
events.  The informants and the participants were asked to answer:  What key 
stakeholders, events and strategies most affected the ratification of House Bill 588?  They 
were then asked to identify people who could answer the same question.  The names were 
then compiled into a list of participants for the next round of inquiry.   
After the preliminary interviews, identification of the major events and strategies, 
and review of some of the documents obtained previously, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with those identified as key participants.  Open-ended questions were 
developed for the interviews.  Such questions provided the needed flexibility to allow the 
respondents to “answer from their own frame of reference rather than from one structured 
by prearranged questions….[thus] getting the subjects to freely express their thoughts 
around particular topics” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p. 3).  The following are the core 
questions that were asked of the interviewees:  
a.  How did members of the Texas Legislature perceive the Hopwood ruling? 
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b.  What influence did the implementation of the Hopwood ruling have on the 
policymaking process of the 75th Legislative Session?    
c.  What conditions within the Texas Legislature favored the final construction of 
House Bill 588, and what where the final provisions of the legislative policy 
addressing minority representation in higher education?  
d.  What key strategies did the author of House Bill 588 implement to facilitate the 
development and passage of the bill?   
The interviews were instrumental in identifying the “societal conditions” that prompted 
the filing of House Bill 588 and in examining the impact of the “legislative conditions” 
within the legislature during the 1997 legislative session.   
The interviews were tape recorded, with the permission of the interviewees.  
Throughout the process, a notebook was maintained detailing descriptive and analytical 
notes.  Notes were arranged in chronological order.  Other data was kept in a loose-leaf 
notebook that was easily separated and rearranged as necessary.  This information was 
then transcribed onto the computer.   
 
Reliability and Validity 
The research design of this study raises the issue of research reliability and 
validity since it is highly dependent on the use of interviews and their trustworthiness.  In 
determining trustworthiness, Lincoln and Guba (1985) mention that inquirers find it 
helpful to ask the following questions: 
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(1) “Truth value”:  How can one establish confidence in the “truth” of the 
findings of a particular inquiry for the subjects (respondents) with which and 
the context in which the inquiry was carried out? 
(2) Applicability:  How can one determine the extent to which the findings of a 
particular inquiry have applicability in other contexts or with other subjects 
(respondents)? 
(3) Consistency:  How can one determine whether the findings of an inquiry 
would be repeated if the inquiry were replicated with the same (or similar) 
subjects (respondents) in the same (or similar) context? 
(4) Neutrality:  How can one establish the degree to which the findings of an 
inquiry are determined by the subjects (respondents) and conditions of the 
inquiry and not by the biases, motivations, interests, or perspectives of the 
inquirer?  (p. 290)  
  Glesne and Peshkin (1992) suggest that “[t]he use of multiple-data-collection 
methods contributes to the trustworthiness of the data” (p. 24).  Following their advice 
and to assure greater validity of the data, the interviewees’ comments were evaluated 
through the use of multiple sources.  Statements given by the interviewees were 
compared with those of other interviewees and with primary and secondary historical 
documents.  However, there is the concern about researcher objectivity, since qualitative 
researchers, as the main research instruments, have their own personal values and beliefs.  
Glesne and Peshkin explain that “[t]he concern with researcher objectivity is replaced by 
a focus on the impact of subjectivity on the research process” (p. 6).       
 43
 This study required the researcher to spend considerable time gathering, analyzing 
and substantiating the data about the politics surrounding the development and enactment 
of House Bill 588.  Like other qualitative studies, its findings portrayed a “description of 
[the] people, places, and conversations” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p.2) which “show[ed] 
the complexity, the contradictions, and the sensibility of [the] social interactions” (Glesne 





















In 1997 the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 588.  The bill established 
uniform admission and reporting procedures for first-time freshman students at the state’s 
colleges and universities.  Historically, Texas colleges and universities have been 
responsible for admissions policies, but in light of the Hopwood ruling, the Texas 
Legislature assumed an unprecedented role in creating this new admissions policy.     
Prior to the 75th Legislature, minority legislators had identified at least two 
external forces as especially harmful to minority representation in higher education.  
These included the Hopwood ruling banning the use of race in admissions decisions at 
The University of Texas School of Law and the actions of Attorney General Dan 
Morales, which introduced stringent implementation policies pursuant to the Hopwood 
ruling.  In addition, policies which made it more difficult for minorities to gain admission 
to state colleges and universities would lower their representation in student populations 
and run counter to demographic trends which indicated increases in minority populations.  
Together, these factors compelled minority legislators to utilize their political positions to 
alter affects they perceived as problematic.  Through converging initiatives, strong 
leadership, and select strategies exercised by key legislative stakeholders during the 
session, House Bill 588 became law.   
The combined pressures of the input factors identified in chapter II made it likely 
that the Texas legislature would address the issue of diversity in higher education.  
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However, according to Meranto’s (1967) model, which guided this study, another main 
source of legislative innovation is found within the system itself.  Therefore, the research 
questions in this chapter were designed to examine the “Conditions within the Texas 
Legislature” that assured the enactment of House Bill 588.  The first question reviews 
which environmental conditions were perceived as a threat by legislators themselves and 
entered the legislative system as input demands.  The second question examines how the 
input demands influenced the Texas legislative policymaking process.  The third and 
fourth questions address the conditions within the legislature that secured the passage of 
House Bill 588.     
 
Research Question 1:  How did members of the Texas Legislature perceive the 
Hopwood ruling?  
This question was designed to examine whether the Hopwood ruling had any 
affect on legislators.  The findings indicated that the ruling had a direct impact, primarily 
on minority legislators who expected that minority enrollment in Texas higher education 
would decline.  There was fear that minority students would be lured by other states 
offering race-based scholarships (Brooks, 1997b).  A great concern was that the 
Hopwood ruling would reverse gains in minority admissions in higher education made 
through past judicial intervention (Montejano, 1997).  In an interview, Mexican-
American Representative Irma Rangel expressed these concerns:  “we were all quite 
devastated with the ruling from Hopwood.”  Although some non-minority legislators 
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shared some of the same concerns, their participation became more evident during 
deliberations about legislative proposals introduced during the legislative session.  
It is clear from the study’s findings that minority legislators converted the 
Hopwood ruling to a political demand.  They did this by linking the ruling to a new 
educational “crisis,” arousing public opinion and generating support for remedial 
legislation.  Mexican-American State Senator Gonzalo Barrientos was the first to utilize 
his political position to seek a solution. 
Interview respondents indicated that Barrientos initiated statewide forums to 
discuss the adverse affects of the Hopwood ruling and to propose possible solutions.  A 
former member on Barrientos’ staff noted that the Senator was among the first to act.  
The staff member said:  
when the Hopwood decision came down, within a month there was a press flurry, 
and within a month Senator Barrientos had organized a meeting of Hispanic 
elected officials, community activists, educators, college professors, etc….to take 
a look at the impact of Hopwood and discuss possible remedies. 
The longtime staff member also noted that the Senator:  
has built a career around civil rights issues, built a career around affirmative 
action issues, and has been working on this since the ‘60s.  So, he has a history 
that he brings to it and a reputation that is national, and especially within the 
Latino community.  I think that he was already a leader in this area and it was 
natural for him to step forward as the leader in the State to bring these different 
Latino groups together. 
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David Montejano, an associate professor of history and sociology and then-
director of the Center for Mexican American Studies at The University of Texas at 
Austin, who attended the first meeting convened by Barrientos, concurred that the 
Senator provided the leadership for the statewide forums.  In an interview, Montejano 
said that the Barrientos had invited him and a few other faculty members of The 
University of Texas Center for Mexican-American Studies to participate in addressing 
the affects of the Hopwood ruling.   
Reflecting on the dialog at that meeting, another attendee stated in an interview 
that, “with fifty people in the room all with strong opinions on the issue, it was difficult 
to focus.  What that meeting basically led to was a consensus to study the issue further, 
and come back in the fall with proposals.” 
The next meeting was held at the LBJ School of Public Affairs in Austin.  
According to Montejano, “it was a big conference of 100 people or more.  And there 
were several proposals presented at that time.” 
  That was the first time that Rangel, became involved in the discussion on how the 
State could address the impact of the Hopwood ruling.  Rangel credited Barrientos with 
including her in the discussions he had organized.  In an interview, she stated, “Senator 
Gonzalo Barrientos invited me to be on a panel of a conference at the LBJ School.”   
In an interview, Montejano said that he remembered when Rangel joined the 
forum discussions.  He said, “Irma Rangel was at that conference.  That was the first time 
that Irma got involved directly.  She was one of the panelists.”   
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  However, the complexity of the issue and lack of cohesiveness that characterized 
the discussions concerned Rangel, who noted that progress was slow.  She said, “I just 
couldn’t see that we were getting anywhere.”  With the upcoming legislative session only 
a few months away, Rangel added that she felt like someone had to come up with 
something to replace the Hopwood opinion.  “Otherwise we would have to wait a whole 
year and seven months before our students would be given the access to higher education 
that they had not had,” she stated. 
  In an interview, a senior staff member for Rangel confirmed that Rangel felt the 
pressure of the upcoming legislative session.   The staff member said that the upcoming 
session created a sense of urgency, which prompted Rangel to conduct smaller meetings 
in her Capitol office in Austin.  Montejano was part of the transition that occurred 
between the public forums to the more individualized group meetings.  In his interview 
comments he said, “we started having meetings after that conference—small meetings, 
working meetings—with Irma and Gonzalo.  Sometimes together and then, of course, as 
the process started developing, individually.”  
The above statements suggest that minority legislators had perceived the adverse 
affects of the Hopwood ruling and sought a legislative solution.  Their combined 
initiatives were instrumental in putting pressure on the Texas Legislature to address the 
issue of minority representation in higher education.  
In summary, the above findings indicate that the Texas Legislature responded to 
the Hopwood ruling.  Specifically, minority legislators perceived its adverse affect on 
minority representation in higher education and converted the ruling to a political 
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demand.  They utilized their political resources to seek a legislative solution.  Building on 
what Senator Gonzalo Barrientos initiated, Representative Irma Rangel would eventually 
succeed in drafting an acceptable response, House Bill 588.    
 
Research Question 2:  What influence did the implementation of the Hopwood 
ruling have on the policymaking process of the 75th Legislative Session? 
The findings revealed that Texas lawmakers filed over 20 pieces of legislation 
countering the ruling’s impact.  The bills would encourage a diverse study body in higher 
education through new admissions criteria, provide financial assistance to keep students 
in Texas schools, protect admissions officials from liability associated with the ruling, 
and require state agencies to conduct studies to determine disparities in admissions of 
college students (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1997).  In an editorial, a 
major local newspaper acknowledged the importance of such legislation because minority 
students were expected to be the majority of Texas residents in the near future, yet were 
underrepresented in higher education (“Bills counter,” 1997, p. A12).     
Minority legislators sought legislative redress to “soften the blow to minorities 
and others from Attorney General Dan Morales’ interpretation,” (“Bills counter,” 1997, 
A12) which imposed race-neutral guidelines on state colleges and universities.  Justifying 
his position, Morales said that the guidelines complied with the decision by the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals that The University of Texas at Austin School of Law may not 
use race in admitting students.  Morales advised that not following the guidelines could 
have negative legal ramifications for institutions and individuals alike (Morales, 1996b).  
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When the 75th Legislature convened, Morales briefed a joint committee on his 
formal opinion regarding the Hopwood ruling and reiterated and extended his stance 
against affirmative action policies.  At the briefing, he told lawmakers that it is illegal to 
recruit, admit or retain minority students based on race-based programs (Brooks, 1997c).  
Morales also:  
surprised lawmakers with new interpretations of Hopwood.  The case, he said, 
governs all internal university policies, including hiring programs for faculty and 
administrators, and covers private colleges that receive public dollars.  But, he 
said, the ruling does not apply to the state’s main affirmative action program.  The 
“historically underutilized business” program sets goals for awarding state 
contracts to women- and minority-owned businesses.  (Brooks, 1997c, p. A1)             
Minority legislators criticized the opinion as being too broad and ignoring Texas’ long 
history of legal segregation, including the Dred Scott and Jim Crow laws (Brooks, 1997c, 
p. A1).  African-American State Representative Al Price, Democrat-Beaumont, said, 
“What happened happened over 400 years—that’s not injustice—that’s oppression” 
(Brooks, 1997c, p. A1).  Interestingly, Rangel defended Morales.  She said, “General 
Morales is simply trying to interpret a bad case….Let’s not lose sight of the real problem 
here” (Foy, 1997, p. A6). 
 The Fort Worth Star Telegram reported on reaction to Morales’ briefing and, 
“talk around the capitol made it clear that affirmative action has jumped to a prominent 
spot on this session’s agenda” (Campbell, 1997, p. B5).  As might be expected in shaping 
major public policy, there were differing perspectives on how to respond to the Hopwood 
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ruling and Morales’ interpretation.  Democrats supported race-based legislation as part of 
the solution to ensure a diverse student body in institutions of higher education.  
Republicans strongly opposed the use of race in any university admissions decisions.   
A. P. Brooks, education reporter for the Austin American-Statesman noted that 
Republicans were “determined to keep race out of any bills aimed at boosting minority 
enrollment at Texas schools.  They want race-neutral policies that would help 
disadvantaged students of all races” (Brooks, 1997a, p. A1).  Additionally, the climate for 
admissions legislation that would receive favorable consideration in the Texas Senate 
was set early on in the session by the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee 
Senator Teel Bivins, Republican-Amarillo.  He made it clear that any race-neutral bill 
giving preference to disadvantaged students would likely pass out of his committee, but 
race-based legislation would not (Brooks, 1997a).   
The shift in political power that had occurred in the 1996 election further 
intensified the debate over access to higher education.  Though the Democrats still held 
an 82-68 majority in the House, Republicans now controlled the Senate by a 17-14 
majority, and no bill could pass without their support.  Ultimately no legislation could be 
enacted without the support of the Republican governor, who held veto power. 
The local media provided the best description of the political climate in 1997.  It 
speculated that:  
the issue could thrust lawmakers into a bitter and partisan debate over affirmative 
action that they managed to sidestep in 1995.  At stake is the future of affirmative 
action programs in Texas colleges and universities and millions of dollars in state-
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financed scholarships for blacks and Hispanics.  Although the federal court ruling 
in the so-called Hopwood case struck down an affirmative action program at The 
University of Texas law school, there are conflicting opinions about how broadly 
to interpret it.  (Brook, 1997a, p. A1) 
Minority legislators, who led efforts within the legislative system to address this 
issue were determined to get legislative relief.  They introduced over 20 pieces of 
legislation, calling for new initiatives to curtail the adverse affects they expected would 
result from the Hopwood ruling.  Since there were numerous similarities in the legislation 
drafted, the review of these initiatives is grouped by the four areas of major concern to 
minority legislators:  admissions, financial aid, parity and indemnification.   
Admissions  
The Texas Legislature considered over 20 alternatives on how to respond to the 
affects of the Hopwood ruling.  A review of bills filed in 1997 identified three primary 
pieces of legislation that attempted to address the most immediate concern—statewide 
admissions policies.  These included Senate Bill 1419, House Bill 588 and House Bill 
589.  By the end of the session only House Bill 588, a race-neutral bill, was enacted.  The 
bill’s intent was to ensure equitable access to higher education for all students in Texas.  
Senate Bill 1419, introduced by Senator Royce West, Democrat-Dallas, Senator 
Gonzalo Barrientos, Democrat-Austin, and Senator Teel Bivins, Republican-Amarillo, 
would have created a three-tiered admissions procedure for institutions of higher 
education.  The first tier would have required that at least 50 percent of all admissions 
offers made by a college or university be based on an applicant’s academic standing in 
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his/her high school graduating class, test scores, and other traditional factors used by the 
institution.  However, automatic admissions would be granted to applicants graduating in 
the top 10 percent of their high school graduating class.  Tier two stipulated that at least 
40 percent of admissions offers be made by taking into account an applicant’s academic 
standing as well as a list of economic or educational factors (Senate Research Center, 
1997a).  Tier three mandated that up to 10 percent of admissions made by an institution 
be offered to applicants who met such factors as “potential to succeed…[or whether they 
could] help the institution further its mission” (Senate Research Center, 1997a, p.2).  
Although the Texas Senate passed Senate Bill 1419 on April 10, 1997 and sent it 
to the House, Rangel had already determined that House Bill 588 was a better solution to 
the Hopwood ruling.  Therefore, the House Higher Education Committee replaced the 
original Senate bill with language requiring that students granted an athletic scholarship 
meet minimum admissions criteria for all college freshman students.  The substituted 
version of the bill was enacted into law.7  
House Bill 588 was introduced by State Representative Irma Rangel, Democrat-
Kingsville.  It established a uniform admissions system for first-time freshman students.  
Each state institution of higher education would automatically admit students graduating 
in the top 10 percent of their graduating class.  Academic institutions also would have the 
option of adopting an automatic admissions policy for students graduating in the top 25 
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7 In response to the strong probability that race-based legislation had little to no chance of passing, African-
American Representative Ron Wilson, Democrat-Houston, proposed language requiring the same academic 
standards for college athletes and nonathletes.   Wilson said, “If they admit a student athlete with a 2.0 
GPA and 850 Scholastic Aptitude Test, then they have to admit regular students who have the same grades 
and test scores. I am very pleased with this” (Brooks, 1997g, pp. B1, B8). 
percent of their graduating classes.  For students not qualified under either of the two 
automatic admissions procedures, this legislation provided institutions with various 
socioeconomic factors they could consider in their admissions decisions (House Research 
Organization, 1997a).  The Texas House of Representatives passed House Bill 588 on 
April 16, 1997.  On May 8, 1997, it was passed by the Texas Senate.  The bill was signed 
by the governor on May 20, 1997, and became effective on September 1, 1997.  
House Bill 858, introduced by State Representative Tony Goolsby, Republican-
Dallas, intended to provide greater accessibility to higher education by creating an open 
enrollment admissions procedure for undergraduate students.  Open enrollment is 
practiced at two Texas universities, Texas Southern University and University of 
Houston-Downtown (Senate Research Center, 1997c).  The legislation would have 
required a one percent admission through open enrollment at institutions with an 
enrollment of 30,000 or more.  Institutions with an enrollment of 10,000 or more, but less 
than 30,000, would have two percent admitted through open enrollment.  A two percent 
admission through open enrollment would have been required at institutions with an 
enrollment of less than 10,000 (House Bill 858, 1997).  While the Texas House of 
Representatives passed this bill on April 15, 1997, it did not receive a hearing in the 
Senate Education Committee.                    
Despite the above admissions legislation, supporters of “affirmative action” 
policies still feared that race-neutral policies would not ensure an equal educational 
opportunity for all Texas youth (House Research Organization, 1997b).  Their concerns 
were validated by a study conducted by the Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity 
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that was created by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to develop 
guidelines that might be used in admissions, financial aid decisions, and other programs 
to achieve diversity in higher education.  The committee predicted that: 
Although numerous criteria (such as income, parents’ education and school 
district wealth) may be useful in identifying segments of the population in need, 
no single criterion or combination of criteria will result in the same level of 
minority participation as occurred under criteria used prior to Hopwood.   
(Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, 1997, p. I-12)   
Moreover, this state advisory committee reported that any combination of factors such as 
family income or school district wealth would “bring in only 50 to 60 percent of the 
state’s minority pool” (Ackerman, 1997, p. A40).  The committee’s findings disappointed 
those who had originally expressed hope that establishing language for admissions and 
financial aid programs to accommodate the new ruling would continue to attract minority 
students in large numbers (Ackerman, 1997).  Jerry Gaston, a Texas A&M University 
official who chaired the committee, stated that, “[b]efore Hopwood we were doing a poor 
job….After Hopwood, our job is twice as difficult” (Gold, 1997, p. A1).   
Financial Aid 
In Morales’ initial interpretation of the ruling, he extended the ban against the use 
of race for admissions to the awarding of scholarships (Morales, 1996a).  “University 
officials and lawmakers fear[ed] that Texas’ top minority students could be lured by other 
states not abiding by Hopwood” (Brooks & Roser, 1997, p. A1).  The University of 
Houston was the first major college to question Morales’ advice on scholarships 
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(“Houston college,” 1997).  The Coordinating Board advised universities to follow the 
counsel of their school lawyers (Brooks & Roser, 1997, p. A1).   
In his response to educators who requested further clarification, Morales stirred 
up even more controversy among legal scholars and higher education officials when he 
said that his legal opinion extended beyond admissions, financial aid, fellowships and 
employment practices at public universities.  “[H]e implied that private universities 
accepting government funds should also revise their policies if they factor race or 
ethnicity.  And he said schools cannot administer privately funded minority scholarships” 
(Campbell, 1997, p. B5).    
The need for financial aid became an even more significant factor when the report 
by the Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, intended to recommend ways to 
recruit minority students without the use of race, found an alarming level of low-wealth 
among minority families.  The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Advisory 
Committee reported the discouraging results of substituting socioeconomic factors for 
race.  A state newspaper noted that the Committee:    
found that of the 6 million people under 25 in Texas in 1990, minorities 
comprised 62 percent of the 3.13 million belonging to a family of four making 
$25,350; 59 percent of the 4.11 million making $35,000; 57 percent of the 4 
million whose parents’ education was less than a bachelor’s degree; and 62.7 
percent of those where the school district residential property value per student 
was less than $70,000.  (Ackerman, 1997, p. A40) 
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 The state’s advisory committee reported that the “overwhelming majority of cultural 
minority families do not have the income to support their children through higher 
education degree programs” (Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, 1997, p. II- 
22).  The report emphasized that “financial support has become the most significant 
variable for attending institutions of higher education in Texas; particularly as a result of 
the current Hopwood decision” (Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, 1997, p. 
II-22).  The report also stated that: 
Access is too often assumed to be primarily a matter of admission to an 
institution.  If retention is improved, the number of minority students enrolled 
would increase dramatically (as for all underserved populations).  A major 
deterrent to retention is not simply academic performance, or student desire; it is 
financial ability to remain in school and not have to leave for employment. 
(Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, 1997, p. I-16) 
When speaking on the Senate admissions bill, Senate Bill 1419, several higher 
education state officials advocated for increased funds.  Don Brown, then deputy higher 
education commissioner, stated:  “If the admissions policy is changed and no more 
financial aid is available, it will be hard…to maintain the current level of minority 
students” (Brooks, 1997d, p. B1).  Brown stressed the importance of additional funds for 
need-based tuition scholarships to retain at least the same number of minority students.  
He further anticipated that, “If race and ethnicity are not included in consideration for 
admission, the amount of financial aid would need to be doubled or tripled” (Brooks, 
1997e, p. A1).  Robert Furgason, President, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, said:  
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“Financial aid is one of the things that’s a real barrier to a number of students in the local 
region” (Howard, 1997, p. A1).  Texas A&M University-Kingsville President Manuel 
Ibanez agreed stating, “The investment is critical….I think you can sum it up by saying 
that the state of Texas will not survive the economic buffeting it’s going to take unless we 
train our population better” (Howard, 1997, p. A1).  
Texas A&M University-College Station President Ray Bowen argued that the 
Hopwood decision did not create an admissions problem.  He said: 
I’ve been preaching for months and nobody will listen to me.  It’s not an 
admissions problem for a place that uses our admission criteria.  We never used 
race as a defining element….The tragedy is our state’s expansion of its 
interpretation of Hopwood to include financial aid.  What we’re concerned with 
now is that the minority students we admit will not accept our offer of admission 
because out-of-state institutions have provided better financial aid.  (Kirsch, 1997, 
pp. A1, A4) 
Because the Senate admission’s bill did not address such issues as scholarships, 
retention, and recruitment, the San Antonio Express-News reported that some observers 
of the Senate admissions bill felt it was “unlikely to be as effective as the affirmative-
action process used before Hopwood” (“Admissions changes,” 1997, p. B6).   
 African-American State Senator Rodney Ellis, Democrat-Houston, introduced a 
bill to increase financial support for students.  He proposed establishing a new 
scholarship program to be funded by a new lottery game.  The initiative called the HOPE 
Scholarship Program would have required students to maintain a B average, while also 
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performing community service.  Ellis stated:  “Every Texan deserves the chance to earn a 
college education” (Brooks, 1997f, p. B4).  The senator also said:  “Although I have 
never bought a lottery ticket in my life, people like me would certainly buy many lottery 
tickets if we knew that that money—in the unlikely event we lose—would go to funding 
the Hope Scholarship Program” (Spicer, 1997, p. A24).   
  Another senator speaking in favor of additional financial aid was Democratic 
State Senator Royce West, an African-American from Dallas.  He said:  “ I will do 
everything I can as a member of the Senate Education Committee to get funding for the 
fall of 1998, so that students can afford an education and so that universities can have 
outreach programs to attract students” (Lee, 1997, p. B9). 
While all of these efforts were intended to benefit whichever admissions 
legislation passed, Rangel, who also filed legislation to increase need-based financial aid, 
did not exert too much effort in this area.  In an interview, she said that she disregarded 
all criticism implying that access legislation was “not going to go anywhere” unless it 
had appropriate funds.  She preferred to separate the success of House Bill 588 from a 
dependence on funding.  
  Table 2 shows a summary of the 75th Legislature’s appropriations in response to 
the anticipated impact of the Hopwood ruling.  There was no consensus on whether the 






Summary of the 75th Legislature’s major spending issues resulting 
from Hopwood’s impact on higher education 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
• SB 1898 authorized emergency appropriations of $10 million to increase tuition  
     assistance grants provided by the coordinating board and $2.5 million was allocated  
  to Texas A&M, also for needy students.   
 
• House Bill 1, the General Appropriations Act, reinstated special provision riders in the  
    1996-97 appropriation’s bill expressing legislative priority to recruit and retain  
    disadvantaged students. 
 
• Rider 32, in the General Appropriations Act, required the Higher Education  
     Coordinating Board to recommend funding formula to the 76th Legislature that  
  reward institutions for making improvements in recruiting, retaining and graduating  
     the educationally disadvantaged students. 
 
• The New Horizon Scholarship Fund created by SB 576 was funded by monies   
      originally appropriated to the Disadvantaged Scholarship strategy (C.1.3) in the  
     coordinating board’s budget. 
 
• Rider 16 in the comptroller’s budget, included in the General Appropriations Act,  
    requires the comptroller to conduct a disparity study to determine whether past acts of   
discrimination by higher education institutions have created any present effects of  
discrimination. 
 





Some advocates of affirmative action attempted to encourage minority students to 
enroll in Texas universities through legislation that could meet the standard set by the 
Hopwood opinion and the guidelines introduced by Attorney General Morales (House 
Research Organization, 1997b).  In his opinion, Morales stated that race could be used in 
isolated cases where the state could prove past discrimination and present effects of such 
past discrimination (Morales, 1997).   
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In the Texas House of Representatives, the two minority legislative caucuses, the 
Texas Legislative Black Caucus and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus, met to 
craft legislation which would require studies to determine disparities in admissions of 
students.  Once identified, these disparities could serve as a basis for admission policies 
(Foy, 1997).  One bill was introduced by Rangel, a member of the Mexican-American 
Legislative Caucus.  The bill required that universities compare their enrollment of 
minority students to the minority proportion of students graduating from public high 
schools in Texas.  If university minority enrollment proved to be lower, the bill would 
have allowed universities to use race as a factor for admission.  Additionally, the bill 
would have required that undergraduate schools compare their minority admission 
numbers with those of minority students receiving high school diplomas.  Graduate and 
professional schools would also be required to compare their minority admission 
numbers with those of minority students receiving baccalaureate degrees (House Bill 
3418, 1997).  African-American State Representative Ruth Jones McClendon, Democrat-
San Antonio, said:  “It’s an extra hurdle to spend the money, but what has happened now 
is that the Attorney General’s Office is forcing us to prove that disparity does exist” (Foy, 
1997, p. A6). 
Morales, however, cautioned that it would be difficult to meet the challenging 
standards set in Rangel’s bill.  He noted:  “Theoretically it’s possible….On a practical 
matter, it’s almost impossible.  The bar is very high” (Moreno, 1997a, p. A21).  
 In the Senate, a discussion on the merits of parity became intense.  On a bill 
requiring the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to collect and maintain data on 
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minority enrollment, minority senators threatened to hold back university funds if 
university administrators failed to find a way around race-based admissions (Walt & 
Hughes, 1997).  University of Texas at Austin Law School Dean Michael Sharlot 
responded to this dialog saying that:  
We are the victims in the Hopwood case and it is terribly unfair, to say the least, 
to turn us into the villains….We’ve had very substantial minority representation 
in the school for the last two decades.  This is the school that has produced more 
minority lawyers than any law school in the United States.  (Walt & Hughes, 
1997, p. A37, A40)    
University of Texas Chancellor William Cunningham commented:  
We are committed to doing everything humanly possible to have a diverse student 
population at the University of Texas…..We are very disappointed with the 
numbers.  We are doing everything we can to increase the number of minorities 
and to run a first-class educational enterprise.  (Stutz, 1997, p. A33)   
A major state newspaper faulted minority senators for placing the blame for low 
minority enrollment on administrators of the state’s flagship institutions.  It asserted: 
Minority senators can blame the public schools, which are failing to educate too 
many minority children; they can blame irresponsible or overworked parents; they 
can blame the students themselves for placing too low a value on education.  But 
the senators miss their mark by blaming the administrators of Texas’ top colleges 
and universities.  These educators have worked hard to enroll diverse student 
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bodies and remain eager to admit ambitious students regardless of race.  (“After 
Hopwood,” 1997, p. A30)   
The newspaper noted that a “look at the numbers shows that low minority enrollment has 
little to do with Texas universities.  It has everything to do with what takes place in the 
lives of minority students before they reach college age” (“After Hopwood,” 1997, p. 
A30).8   
By the end of the session, little was recommended on this parity issue.  The 
principal exception was a rider in the General Appropriations Act that directed the State 
Comptroller and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to conduct a disparity 
study of higher education institutions. 
Indemnification 
The final category of legislation addressed liability for admissions decisions.  
Representative Irma Rangel and Senator Gonzalo Barrientos each introduced legislation 
to protect state employees who might be held personally liable for decisions made 
relating to admissions policies involving minority applicants.  In an interview, Rangel 
said that she was concerned about these employees as well as “students who are not 
agents of the state because students also serve on some admissions committees.”  
However, this legislation was not well received.  Rangel said that she was told that “the 
State of Texas will indemnify its agent from any lawsuit;” therefore, there was no need 
                                                 
8 The paper cited that “every year there are about 34,000 black 18-year-olds in Texas, but only 21,000 
graduate from high school.  Only 7,500 take the SAT test, essential for admission to selective schools, and 
less than 2,000 make the minimum score.  The number for Hispanics show the same sharply descending 
curve” (“After Hopwood,” 1997, p. A30). 
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for her legislation.  Though Barrientos’ bill received a favorable report from the Senate 
committee, the bill was never scheduled for a vote by the full Senate.   
In summary, though more than 20 pieces of legislation were filed during the 75th 
Legislative Session—each addressing some aspect of higher education that minority 
legislators believed would be adversely affected by the Hopwood ruling and Morales’ 
interpretation—less than a quarter of them were enacted.  The main concern was minority 
underrepresentation in Texas’ institutions of higher education, particularly in light of the 
projected population changes taking place in the State.  Thus, most of the bills addressed 
admissions policies encouraging a diverse student population.  But only one bill on 
admissions policies was enacted.  That was House Bill 588.  Other legislation attempted 
to secure state financial assistance for high school graduates who attend a public 
institution of higher education.  The General Appropriations Act addressed this request 
by increasing some of its tuition assistance grants, but there was no consensus on its level 
of significance.  The little interest in parity resulted in a directive to conduct a limited 
disparity study of higher education institutions, which included the collection of data on 
minority enrollment, including data on recruitment, admissions, retention, and graduation 
at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.  This initiative was included in the General 
Appropriations Act.  Finally, two bills that would have indemnified state employees of 
higher education institutions making admissions decisions failed to gain support.     
The above findings indicate that the policymaking process was impacted by the 
Hopwood decision, as well as Morales’ subsequent interpretation of it.  However, the new 
conservative political climate largely influenced which legislation passed and which did 
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not.  By the end of the session, affirmative action policies in higher education were 
eliminated and replaced with race-neutral legislation. 
 
Research Question 3:  What conditions within the Texas Legislature favored the 
final construction of House Bill 588, and what were the final provisions of the 
legislative policy addressing minority representation in higher education?    
It is clear from the above findings that the legislative policymaking process in 
1997 was influenced by external forces.  The Hopwood ruling created input demands on 
the Texas Legislature when minority legislators perceived that its adverse affects would 
require a legislative solution.  These input demands resulted in the introduction of over 
20 pieces of legislation.  Meranto (1967) asserted that environmental conditions alone do 
not produce new policy output; institutional forces are essential in bringing about 
legislative innovation.  The three institutional forces within the Texas Legislature that 
were key to the success of House Bill 588 were: (1) the initiative and leadership of the 
Chair of the House Higher Education Committee; (2) the support of the Chair of the 
Senate Education Committee; and (3) the control held by the Democrats in the Texas 
House of Representatives.   
Chair of the House Higher Education Committee  
During the 75th Legislature, the House Higher Education Committee addressed 
the issue of minority access to higher education in the State of Texas.  Consistent with the 
findings by Kraemer et al. (1996) that public policy gains consideration through the 
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efforts of key legislators, it was Rangel, Chair of the Committee, who placed the issue on 
the Committee’s agenda by introducing House Bill 588.  
Several major demand articulators (i.e., education interest groups, private 
citizens/constituents, and state agency legislative liaisons) provided input during the 
committee hearing process.  Much of their input was in the form of demands requiring a 
response.  Review of committee documents helps to explain why certain demands were 
incorporated into the bill and others were not.  For instance, Dr. William H. Cunningham, 
Chancellor of The University of Texas System, was concerned that some of the students 
granted automatic admission might not be prepared to do college work and suggested that 
they be required to enroll in a summer enrichment course.  In an interview, Rangel said 
that she accepted his recommendation because she understood the likelihood that some 
students might not know their academic standing in their graduating class, and other 
students simply might not have had the option of taking college preparatory courses 
because their high school did not offer them.  She added, “let’s face it, when we go to 
South Texas, we have many school districts that do not appropriate the monies that other 
very rich school districts do.”  Rangel said that she accepted Cunningham’s proposal on 
the condition that “everyone, not just the 10 percent” would be permitted to enroll in the 
summer enrichment courses because she did not want to single out any group of students.  
Thus, this provision was added to House Bill 588.   
  In testimony before the House Higher Education Committee, Cunningham further 
asked that students be required to take college preparatory courses in high school.  Dr. 
Leo Zavedra, Deputy Chancellor of Texas A&M University System, supported this 
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suggestion.  He stated, “I think it’s important that the bill address the high school 
curriculum.  It’s important that high schools and public schools reinforce and focus on 
providing college bound courses so that the students can better succeed.”  In related 
testimony, Al Kauffman, an attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (MALDEF), opposed the inclusion of such a mandate.  He pointed out 
that not all schools are able to provide a wide range of preparatory programs, and some 
students are “late bloomers.”  He said that while some “late bloomers” (juniors or 
seniors) rank in the top ten percent of their class, they may not have taken the college 
preparatory courses because they did not anticipate going to college.  Rangel did not 
accepted Cunningham’s recommendation.  She agreed with Kauffman.    
On another provision, Cunningham urged the committee members to reconsider 
the “timeframe” in which students must decide whether to accept their automatic 
admission.  Cunningham recommended that students be given only one year to decide 
whether or not they want to pursue a college degree. 
Fearing that students would lose a one-time opportunity to go to college, 
Kauffman voiced opposition of this recommendation.  While he understood the logistical 
problems for the universities, he advised the committee against giving students only one 
year to take advantage of their high school record.  In his testimony, he noted that some 
students “who have done very well in high school, but because of some other reasons, 
such as finances or family circumstances, first have to go to a community college or have 
to wait several years before going back to the University.”  Rangel elected to give 
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students two years subsequent to their high school graduation to accept or reject their 
automatic admission. 
In other testimony before the committee, Zavedra urged the members to “provide 
adequate financial aid packages to students” who meet the admissions criteria.  This 
request was supported by David Montejano, then-director of the Center for Mexican 
American Studies at The University of Texas at Austin, who cited statistics indicating 
that the 10 percent plan would yield greater numbers of minority students.  He cautioned 
that without a component providing financial aid, the bill’s success would be in jeopardy.  
However, Dr. Michael Olivas, law professor at the University of Houston, disagreed with 
the emphasis on funding.  He believed that the problem with the Hopwood ruling was 
primarily with the admissions process, not with financial aid.  Rangel choose not to 
address the issue of financial aid because it would add to the difficulty of passing the bill.           
There were additional issues raised regarding the socioeconomic factors that 
institutions consider in making admissions decisions.  For example, the inclusion of test 
scores prompted a supporter of the bill to voice his concern.  In his testimony, Kauffman 
noted that standardized test scores should not be among the admissions factors because 
“the performance on test scores has a tremendous detracting affect and has reduced 
minority participation in universities, and has also reduced the participation of low-
income Whites in universities.”  Rangel allowed the inclusion of the applicant’s 
performance on standardized test to be included among the 18 socioeconomic admissions 
factors.    
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Finally, several witnesses testified in support of expanding the automatic 
admissions percentile.  One witness, representing himself, said that he preferred an 
automatic admissions policy for students ranking in the top 25 percent of their class, not 
just the top 10 percent.  He asked, “What happens to the rest of the class not lucky 
enough to be in the top 10 percent?”  This witness urged Rangel and the committee to 
consider expanding automatic admission to “the top 25 percent minimally.”  A student 
from San Antonio concurred.  The student expressed his support for the bill only if it 
extends “to more than the top 10 percent of all students, and also includes academically 
challenging parochial schools.”  The recommendation to increase the automatic 
admission level was rejected.   
The above committee input suggests that there was extensive interest in the 
adoption of access legislation.  Recognizing the validity of all the input, Rangel left the 
bill pending in the committee for one week to make the modifications she felt would 
increase the bill’s acceptability.  
The following week, Rangel offered a committee substitute to House Bill 588.  
She had acceded to the following major demands:  1) allowing students at least two years 
to decide whether or not to pursue a college degree, and 2) maintaining the universities’ 
ability to consider an applicant’s performance on standardized tests.  
She had decided that the inclusion of some of the other recommendations might 
have compromised the bill’s success.  For instance, granting automatic admission to the 
top 10 percent was a challenge in itself.  Extending automatic admission to a higher 
percentage could have opened an entirely new discussion over “limited capacity” in the 
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already-crowded institutions of higher education.  Additionally, without secured funding, 
topics such as mandated college preparatory courses and increased financial aid could 
have extended discussions beyond the 140 days allocated to making laws in Texas.  
Rangel’s intent was to keep the bill simple and as palatable as possible.  As substituted, 
House Bill 588 received unanimous support from the full committee.  On March 25, 
1997, the committee sent the bill to the full House.   
Additional evidence further illustrates Rangel’s ability to effectively manage 
unprecedented legislation.  She had not only studied this issue in detail and addressed the 
major concerns before the bill got to the House floor, but she also welcomed an open 
discussion before the full House.   
During the second reading of the bill on the House floor, the sensitivity of the 
issue led to a two-hour debate.  A reporter for the Houston Chronicle said that House Bill 
588 “drew barbs from several House conservatives who contend it would unfairly 
discriminate against students who have done well academically but don’t meet other 
admissions criteria” (Hughes, 1997, p. A1).   
The Fort Worth Star Telegram reported the controversy over the list of 
socioeconomic factors authorized for use in admissions decisions:  
The most criticized provision of the bill mandates that a third tier of students be 
admitted based on a range of criteria, including a student’s socioeconomic 
background, bilingual proficiency, geographical location and responsibilities 
outside of school, such as work or helping to raise siblings.”  (Sanchez, 1997, p. 
B5) 
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One of the Republican legislators who strongly opposed this provision of the bill 
was Representative Frank Corte of San Antonio.  In a speech on the House floor he said 
that the third category  “devalues the education process” because admission would be 
determined by “unrelated academic areas.”  Also referring to the 18 factors in the third 
tier, Representative Charlie Howard, Republican-Sugar Land, argued that students who 
are White, live in a middle-income-suburban area, whose parents went to college and are 
not bilingual, would be at a disadvantage because so few of the factors would apply to 
them, thus diminishing their probability of getting admitted to a university under the bill.  
“The third category is left to the discretion of the universities,” responded Rangel.  “It is 
their choice to determine which factors they consider important.”  
Representative Arlene Wohlgemuth’s, Republican-Burleson, opposed the bill 
because home-schooled students and those attending unaccredited Christian schools 
would be left out.  During the House floor debate, she argued that these students would 
be excluded from admissions under the automatic top 10 percent rule and the optional 
automatic top 25 percent rule because these two sections in the bill apply only to “a 
public or private high school in this state accredited by a generally recognized accrediting 
organization.”   
  While Wohlgemuth’s concern received some sympathy, the solution she sought 
for home-schooled students would have jeopardized the success of House Bill 588.  
Though frustrated, Wohlgemuth acknowledged that she had already spoken with Rangel 
about granting automatic admission to home-schooled students, and also noted that this 
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practice “would not be fair to the other students” because of the possibility that all home-
schooled students could be considered in the top 10 percent of their one-student class.    
 Representative Jerry Madden, Republican-Richardson, was concerned about how 
the bill would affect his legislative district.  Noting that disparity exists between school 
districts, Madden argued that House Bill 588 would be a “discriminatory bill against top 
performing school districts,” because “the lower performing school districts, were going 
to get 10 percent also.”  He added that:   
those of us who have top performing school districts in the state, we’re going to, 
in fact, lose some of our students who may not rate in the top 10 percent, but 
academically will be known by the universities to be high performing students; 
[they] are not going to get the same opportunity and the same automatic 
acceptance.     
Representative Charlie Howard, Republican-Sugarland, echoed Madden’s 
opposition, saying that the bill was contradictory to the Hopwood case that prohibited the 
giving of preferences.  He asked his colleagues to think about when they would return to 
their districts and begin to receive calls from parents complaining that they can’t get their 
children into a major university in the State of Texas.  Specifically referring to the top 10 
percent automatic admissions section of the bill, he warned:  
if we pass this bill, the reason’s going to be because we have an inequitable group 
taking up a significant portion, 43.1 percent of the slots.  It’s a sheer numbers 
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game.  We’re going to have diversity.  This is a very diverse state.  We have 
diversity now, we’re going to have diversity in the future. 9  
Opposition to the bill also resulted in the introduction of two House floor 
amendments, both considered unfriendly by the author of House Bill 588.  Review of 
these two amendments will be found later in this chapter.  
 Representative Ted Kamel, Republican-Tyler, a member of the House Higher 
Education Committee, was the only Republican who spoke in support of House Bill 588 
on the House floor.  He said, “this is a solution to Hopwood.”  He added, “We’re not 
micro-managing admissions standards.  The bill is asking universities to consider other 
subjective criteria when making admissions decisions.”         
At the end of the debate, Rangel made no attempt to make any changes.  In her 
closing remarks, Rangel simply stated: 
This is not a bill that was drafted overnight.  We have been working since last 
June on this bill.  We have been working along with Dr. Ricardo Romo from The 
University of Texas at Austin who is a historian; Dr. David Montejano who also 
is an expert in history; Professor Gerald Torres, a law professor at The University 
of Texas Law School; and some of the chancellors from the universities.  We’ve 
been working with them since last June.  We’ve been working with Al Kauffman 
from the Mexican American Legal Defense Education Fund.  We’ve been 
working with Attorney General Dan Morales also.  And we have been working 
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9 According to his statistics, Howard also cited that 85 percent of the admissions slots are accounted for, 
based on specific criteria in the bill, leaving only 15 percent for the remaining students.  He told his 
colleagues, “You’re going to have a difficult time explaining that.” 
with the Coordinating Board as well.  And we have been working with a 
representative from the governor’s office as well; and then, Professor Michael 
Olivas, who is a professor at the University of Houston Law School who is the 
expert not only in the State of Texas but who is an expert in the country on higher 
education law. 
Again, emphasizing that the bill was a collaborative effort she said, “these are the 
people who have contributed to this bill.  They are the ones who composed the bill.  I am 
only here to explain the bill.”  Making one final point, Rangel said that the bill did not 
show preference for “one student over another….We’re making reference to high schools 
from Plano.  We’re making reference to high schools from Lubbock to Dallas….We’re 
not saying high schools from South Texas, we’re saying from each high school.”  In a 77-
68 vote, primarily divided along party lines, the full House passed House Bill 588 to third 
reading (Record Vote #153, 1997).  
On the third reading of the bill, Kamel again tried to make an appeal to his 
Republican colleagues to support House Bill 588 by telling them “the governor’s office is 
not in opposition to this bill.”   According to Rangel, Kamel wanted to say that the 
governor supported this bill, but he was told he could only say that the governor did not 
oppose it.  In an interview, Rangel recalled that Kamel’s message did not change many 
votes.  A recorded vote was not available on third reading to allow for an comparative 
analysis of the two votes (House Journal, 1997b).  Upon the third and final passage in the 
House, the bill was sent to the Senate for its consideration. 
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It is important to note that Rangel’s contributions extended beyond her use of her 
power as Chair of the House Education Committee and her firm advocacy of the bill 
before the full House.  She also put into place five key strategies that paved the way for 
House Bill 588.  Because the passage of the bill cannot be fully explained without a 
detailed review of these strategies, they will be presented in the final research question.  
Support of the Chair of the Senate Education Committee 
 A second institutional force that favored the enactment of House Bill 588 was the 
support from Senator Teel Bivins, Chairman of the Senate Education Committee.  Bivins’ 
contributions began before House Bill 588 had been referred to his committee.  The 
Republican Senator had already committed to developing a response to the Hopwood 
ruling.   In fact, he had joined Senator Royce West, Democrat-Dallas, and Senator 
Gonzalo Barrientos, Democrat-Austin, each of whom had a different view about 
affirmative action policies than he (Lee, 1997).  Despite this difference, they drafted 
Senate Bill 1419 together.  This bill was more commonly referred to as the “50, 40, 10 
percent plan” because of the three-tiered admissions system the bill proposed.  
Bivins said, “[t]hese senators and I have worked on achieving a race-neutral 
admissions policy for our state universities.…I believe this legislation addresses concerns 
raised by the Hopwood decision in a race-neutral fashion” (Fikac, 1997, p. A31).  West 
also emphasized their collaboration.  He stated “It’s a joint effort to zero out the impact 
of Hopwood and approve upon the ability of all children in Texas to get a higher 
education” (Lee, 1997, p. B9). 
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 Despite Bivins’ co-sponsorship, some of his Senate Republican colleagues had a 
different view of the bill.  Senator Steve Ogden, Republican-Bryan, said the bill was  
“overly prescriptive…it’s not fair for all in the state” (Tolley, 1997, p. A24).  Echoing 
Ogden’s opposition, Senator Robert Duncan, Republican-Lubbock, said it was bad public 
policy to prescribe admissions guidelines for the board of regents (Tolley, 1997).  Senator 
Troy Fraser, Republican-Horseshoe Bay, said, “What about the person who has raised 
themselves up by their bootstraps and their children are now starting to go to 
college?...We’re only addressing economically disadvantaged” (Moreno, 1997b, p. D12). 
Though the Senate bill would not prevail in the end, it did help prepare the way 
for House Bill 588.  During the deliberations over the Senate Bill 1419, the Senate settled 
controversial issues such as test scores, funding, and the race-neutral language.  
Therefore, when the House bill arrived, it moved through the Senate without much 
opposition.  Much of the credit is given to the Senate co-authors, West, Barrientos, and 
Bivins.   
Senator Bivins’ support of access legislation was particularly evident when House 
Bill 588 was referred to his committee.  While he could have utilized various tactics to 
bury this legislation for the duration of the session and bargained for the passage of 
Senate Bill 1419, he instead welcomed the House bill.  During the bill’s public hearing 
process, he permitted an open discussion on any issues of concern.  However, his 
willingness to approve the bill’s passage from his committee helped ensure that the other 
committee members would also vote favorably, despite any individual concerns. 
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For instance, one of the concerns expressed during the Senate Education 
committee hearing was the need for additional funds.  Senator Royce West, a committee 
member, said that the passage of House Bill 588 would not be the “cure all,” for the 
Hopwood effect.  He said that financial aid remained a critical issue. 
 Another member, Senator Troy Fraser, Republican-Horseshoe Bay, also voiced 
concern over a statement that he had heard about capacity.  He said that after Senate Bill 
1419 (the Senate cousin to House Bill 588) left the Senate he had heard that, “if we 
mandated that everyone in the top 10 percent of the class automatically have 
admission…[and if] all the top 10 percent decided to go to A & M, they couldn’t handle 
all of those kids.”  He asked, “Are we getting into a dangerous area mandating that they 
automatically be [accepted]?”  Although, there was discussion that helped clarify this 
matter, it was stated that if such a problem did arise, the bill gives the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board rulemaking authority to address the issue.  Furthermore, it 
was stated in committee that The University of Texas had previously indicated that 
neither the Senate bill nor the House bill would create a capacity problem.   
After being considered in the Senate committee the for a few days, legislative 
documentation shows that on May 2, 1997 the bill was reported out of committee without 
amendments. 
Bivins demonstrated his support of House Bill 588 again when it was scheduled 
for a vote on the Senate floor.  When Barrientos, the Senate sponsor, introduced the bill 
to the full Senate, an unexpected and unfriendly amendment was offered.  Legislative 
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documents revealed that almost spontaneously, Bivins stood up and utilized his 
knowledge of Senate rules to defeat the amendment. 
In an interview, Rangel said that she was not at the capitol when House Bill 588 
was brought up in the Senate on second reading.  She said that her staff had to put her call 
on a speaker phone allowing her to hear the Senate floor proceedings.  She said:  
Senator Barrientos brought it [House Bill 588] up as the Senate sponsor of the 
bill, quickly an amendment was recognized by the lieutenant governor.  The 
amendment was by Senator Fraser.  And that amendment had to do with home 
schooling.  When that amendment was brought up, Senator Barrientos said:  “Mr. 
President, I was not told about this amendment.”  And I became very concerned 
that maybe this was going to prolong and delay [the bill] because maybe the 
debate on that amendment might cut it off.  I became very concerned.  Senator 
Bivins stood up and he called a point of order on the amendment. 
According to legislative records, the point of order was well taken and the motion was 
sustained.  With no further discussion, a vote was taken.  The bill passed in a 27–4 vote 
(Senate Journal, 1997).  
Remembering the details of the May 8, 1997 Senate floor debate, Rangel stated in 
an interview: 
Senator Bivins killed the amendment.  Senator Bivins saved the bill.  And then the 
bill passed with only four or six Senators voting against it.  Everybody else voted 
for it because Senator Bivins killed that amendment.  I guess they [Republicans] 
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knew who their leader was, and they followed Senator Bivins.  I have to give him 
credit. 
Consequently, Rangel credits Bivins with having saved the bill on the Senate floor and 
for having encouraged Republican support for the bill in the Senate.   
Since action in the Senate resulted in no changes to the bill, a conference 
committee was not needed to resolve the differences.  House Bill 588 was sent directly to 
the governor for his signature, with almost one month still remaining in the session.          
Democrats Hold Control in the House  
In 1997, the Texas House of Representatives was comprised of 82 Democrats and 
68 Republicans.  Legislative documents suggest that the strength of the Democratic vote 
in the House was the third force within the Texas Legislature that helped secure the 
passage of House Bill 588.   
The Democratic majority first helped defeat an attempt to attach two unfriendly 
amendments to the bill on the House floor.  The first amendment would have granted 
automatic admission to students with a standardized test score in the top 10 percent for 
the year in which they took the test.  The second amendment would have broadened the 
scope of the bill and added additional automatic admissions tiers.  
Record Vote #150 in Table 3 indicates that in a 71-69 vote, the “motion to table” 
the vote on Amendment #1 failed, because 10 Democrats voted to permit its 
consideration.  In addition, Record Vote #151 shows that Democratic opposition defeated 
Amendment #1 in a 76-68 vote and its proposal to complicate House Bill 588 by adding 





  House Vote on Amendments to House Bill 588 - Second Reading  
 
                                  AYE         NAY         PNV          ABS*                      
Record Vote #150:  Amendment #1 – Motion to Table 
   Democrats               65             10            2                 6 
 Republicans              4               61                               2 
 
Total Vote        69            71             2                 8 
 
Record Vote #151:  Amendment #1  
    Democrats                6              72              2                3 
 Republicans            62                4                                1 
 
Total Vote                   68              76              2                4 
 
Record Vote #152:  Amendment #2 – Motion to Table 
    Democrats               73             6                1                 3   
 Republicans               5           62           
 
Total Vote                   78             68               1                 3 
 
* includes members with no recorded votes and those listed as ‘excused’ 
 
                         PNV = present not voting           ABS = absent 
 
Sources:  Record Vote #150 (1997), Record Vote #151 (1997) and Record 
Vote #152 (1997).      
 
  
Record Vote #152 shows that a majority of Democrats voted to support the 
“motion to table” the vote on Amendment #2 in a 78-68 vote.  The data do not reveal 
why some Democratic legislators voted against the “motion to table” the vote on 
Amendment #1 but supported the “motion to table” the vote on Amendment #2.      
When the vote on second reading of House Bill 58 was finally taken, Table 4 
shows that legislators voted primarily along party lines.  As seen on Record Vote #153, 
five Democrats voted against the bill and five Republicans voted for the bill.  Although 
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the four members who were reported “absent,” and the one member reported “present not 
voting” were all Democrats, there were still enough Democrats present in the House to 
secure the bill’s passage to third reading.  On third reading, the vote was not recorded 
(House Journal, 1997b).  
 
Table 4 
  House Vote on House Bill 588 by Political Party - Second Reading 
 
                                  AYE         NAY         PNV          ABS*                      
Record Vote #153:  Passage to Engrossment 
   Democrats                72            5             1                 4 
 Republicans              5           63 
 
Total Vote                  77           68             1                 4 
 
* includes members with no recorded votes and those listed as ‘excused’ 
 
                          PNV = present not voting           ABS = absent 
 
Source:  Record Vote #153 (1997). 
 
  
Commenting on the Democratic legislators who supported the bill, Rangel said 
that those who voted for the bill realized the importance of an education for all Texans, 
and understood the needs of minority students.  In an interview, Rangel said that the five 
Democrats who voted against the bill did so because some    
members, Republicans and Democrats, are very concerned primarily about getting 
reelected, not about doing the right thing.  And, that’s their priority.  And they 
probably come from a very conservative district and had they voted for this, it 
would be educating minorities, and that probably would not be very acceptable in 
their district.  So they are more concerned about getting reelected.  The right thing 
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would have been to have voted for the bill, but they wanted to be reelected 
instead.  That’s why they voted against the bill. 
One Democrat apologized to Rangel for voting against House Bill 588.  In an 
interview Rangel said that legislator told her,  “I’m very sorry I had to vote against your 
bill…if I had voted for your bill, you would have a Republican sitting here.”  Rangel 
responded, “what difference does it make.  If you are a Republican you would have voted 
against it.  You are a Democrat and you voted against it.  I really don’t care who sits in 
that chair, whether it’s you or a Republican.” 
The analysis above shows that Republicans overwhelmingly opposed the bill.  
Attempting to explain this action, Rangel said “they saw it as another affirmative action 
program, and I think that’s why they voted against it.”  She added:  “We didn’t have that 
leadership of the Republicans in the House to let them know better.”   
Then-Governor George Bush’s legislative director, Terrell Smith, had his own 
explanation.  In an interview, he said:  
What you had in the House is so many of the Republicans [who] represented just 
suburban school districts and those are the ones that if anybody was going to be 
hurt by this, it was going to be them.  Because they’re the type of school districts 
in which 30 or 40 percent of their students would score high enough on the SAT 
and take all the honors courses and do all the things that would get them into UT, 
that now are not able to get into UT as a result of the 10 percent rule.  At least, 
that’s the perception.  There may be some truth to it.  And so they come there 
with, like everybody comes:  What can I do for my constituents?  And so they just 
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felt…that it would knock out some of the students they felt had scored very high, 
could do the work, and perhaps were smarter or had better grades or better SAT 
scores than some from poor school districts and inner-city school districts.  I think 
they thought it was unfair.  So that was, as I recall, the nature of the debate. 
Although the majority of the Republican members opposed the bill, five 
Republicans voted for House Bill 588.   Rangel attributes their support to the personal 
friendship she has with each of these members, but more so, she said it was because of 
their compassion and interest in ensuring that all students have access to an equitable 
education.  Unfortunately, she said, one of the five members lost his reelection after that 
session.10 
The statements above suggest that the composition of a legislative district may 
have had an influence on a legislator’s vote.  Without a detailed analysis on each 
legislative district, it is difficult to determine the true affect.  Table 5 only compares the 
votes between those legislators whose district is comprised of “part” of one county and 
those who represent more than one county.  Based solely on this information, the findings 
show that this factor did not have a significant affect on the outcome of the vote.  Perhaps 
a more fundamental comparison would have been to examine various factors within the 
school districts (e.g., test scores, property wealth, minority enrollment, etc.) in each 
legislative district.  Such detailed information was not readily available at the time of this 
study.        
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10 After the 75th Legislative Session, Representative Kamel lost his bid for reelection.  In an interview, State 
Representative Pat Haggerty, Republican-El Paso, said that Kamel’s loss had more to do with a previous 
statement to only serve four terms.    
Interestingly, however, all 5 Republican legislators who voted for the bill 
represented a district composed of only “part” of one county.  These urban-type counties 
were:  Tarrant, Dallas, El Paso, Lubbock and Smith.  Similarly, all 5 Democrats who 
voted against the bill had districts that included more than one county, ranging between 5 
to 17 counties.  These legislators resided in:  Holliday, Portland, Rockdale, Mt. Vernon 
and Voss.  Without additional information, however, it is difficult to reach any definite 
conclusions.     
 
Table 5 
  House Vote on House Bill 588 by District – Second Reading 
 
                                          AYE         NAY         PNV          ABS*                      
Members’ District Includes “Part” of One County 
   Democrat            52                                                  3 
   Republican                         5            42 
 
Members’ District Include More Than One County     
   Democrat                         20               5                1               1 
   Republican                                        21 
 
Total Vote                           77              68               1               4 
 
* includes members with no recorded votes and those listed as ‘excused’ 
 
                          PNV = present not voting           ABS = absent 
 




Another characteristic that could have potentially affected how legislators voted 
on House Bill 588 was their tenure in the legislature.  “Generally speaking, members rank 
lower on the party loyalty continuum as their seniority increases” (Davidson, 1969, p. 
159).  However, Table 6 shows that there was no apparent evidence indicating that tenure 




  House Vote on House Bill 588 by Tenure – Second Reading  
                                          
                                   AYE (D)   AYE (R)   NAY (D)   NAY (R)   PNV   ABS*                      
Members by Tenure 
    Freshman                 11                                             14                       1 
    1- 5 years                 24                              2             24 
    6-10 years                20            5                2             16                       3 
    11-15 years                6                                               7 
    16-20 years                8                              1               1 
    21 years plus             3                                               1            1 
 
Total Vote                   72            5                5             63             1        4                                                                  
 
*   includes members with no recorded votes and those listed as ‘excused’ 
 
 PNV = present not voting        ABS = absent        D = Democrat        R = Republican 
 
Sources:  Record Vote 153 (1997) and Texas House Directory (1997). 
 
  
The breakdown of the vote by tenure shows that, as expected, all of the freshman 
legislators voted along party lines.  Members having between 1-5 years of tenure also 
voted primarily along party lines, with the exception of two Democrats who voted against 
the bill.  In the 6-10 year range, two other Democratic members voted against the bill, 
whereas five Republican members voted for the bill.  Interestingly, only one member 
between 16-20 years of seniority broke party rank.  This Democratic member voted 
against the bill.  And, four of the five most senior members voted along party lines (one 
was present but not voting).  In summary, it appears that party clearly outweighed tenure 
in determining a legislator’s vote.  
A third characteristic to be compared was gender.  In 1997 there were 30 women 
in the Texas House of Representatives:  19 were Democrats and 11 were Republican.  
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Most women legislators voted along party lines with the exception of one Democratic 
female legislator.  Of the 120 male legislators, 63 were Democrats and 57 were 
Republican.  Four of the male Democrats voted against the bill, five male Republicans 
voted for the bill, four were absent and one was present but did not vote.  The majority of 
the men and women voted according to their party affiliation.    
Ethnicity was another characteristic evaluated in this study.  Table 7 indicates that 
almost all African-American and Mexican-American11 legislators supported  House Bill 
588.  While the minority members represented only 28 percent of the total House 
legislative body, they represented over 50 percent of the total Democratic vote.  Thus, 
their support was significant.  
A possible explanation for these members’ votes was their desire to provide 
educational opportunities to constituents who would otherwise be deprived of a higher 
education because an under-funded public school district had failed to prepare them 
adequately for admission to college.  A House report noted the correlation between 
minority performance on tests and low-wealth school districts and indicated that some:  
observers trace gaps in minority performance not to the test but to the system of 
education itself….Those in richer areas can usually spend more per student than 
those in poorer districts, where minority students are disproportionately 
concentrated.  While the state has attempted to level financial resources among 
                                                 
11 The 1997 Mexican American Legislative Caucus Directory shows that 25 of its 27 Mexican-American 
members represented legislative districts with more than a 60 percent minority constituency.  
Representative Irma Rangel was the only Mexican-American legislator not registered in the caucus  
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directory that year (Mexican American Legislative Caucus Directory, 1997).   
school districts, wide gaps remain in funding per student, with clear effects on the 




  House Vote on House Bill 588 by Ethnicity – Second Reading  
 
                                                    AYE        NAY         PNV          ABS*                      
Members by Ethnicity 
   African American                     14 
   Mexican-American                   25              1**                            2  
   White                                        38            67               1               2  
 
Total Vote                                   77            68                1              4                                    
 
*   includes members with no recorded votes and those listed as ‘excused’ 
**  this was the only Republican minority legislator; all other minority legislators were  
Democrats 
 
Sources:  Record Vote #153 (1997) and Texas House Directory (1997). 
  
 
Legislative records show that all but one member of the House minority caucuses, 
Texas Legislative Black Caucus and Mexican American Legislative Caucus, voted for 
House Bill 588.  The one exception was a Republican, Mexican-American legislator, who 
voted for the bill in the House Higher Education Committee, but voted against the bill on 
the House floor.  As a member of the House Committee, this legislator supported the bill 
in order to enable it to reach the floor; however, the legislator voted against the bill on the 
House floor.  The legislator represented a district with a Hispanic population of only 8.9 
percent (Mexican American Legislative Caucus Directory, 1997).  
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The vote in the Senate was different.  In contrast to the vote in the House, which 
was primarily along party lines, a majority of the Senators supported House Bill 588.  
The bill was passed by a 26-5 majority vote.  
Why did House Bill 588 receive such overwhelming support from Republicans in 
the Senate?  Two possible answers were advanced:  (1) senators represent more diverse 
districts than representatives, and (2) Senator Teel Bivins’ leadership.  The first answer 
was given in an interview by then-Governor Bush’s legislative director, Terrell Smith,  
who said that senators: 
have such large districts that they have lots of different people in their districts.  
Not just more minorities perhaps, but poor school districts, rich school districts, 
small school districts, big school districts, and they tend to come to the legislature 
feeling that all of those need to be represented.  
 The second reason—Bivins’ leadership—was provided by Rangel, who credited Bivins 
for the Senate Republican vote.  She had observed and worked closely with the Senator 
throughout the session.  In an interview, she said, “you have most of the Republicans 
voting for the bill.  That’s [due to the] wonderful leadership of Senator Teel Bivins.”   
Bivins also acknowledged his overall influence in the Senate.  In another 
interview, he said:   
as chair of the committee and as a Republican, and someone who I think they 
respect, I think that once they saw my name as co-sponsor of the bill, it went a 
long way to allay fears that it was something that was going to perpetuate the 
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quota system or race-based admission system.  And so I don’t recall any real firm 
opposition.    
Final Provisions of House Bill 588 
As enacted, House Bill 588 (1997) amends Chapter 51 of the Education Code in 
the State of Texas.  The most significant provisions added into this law relate to:  an 
automatic admission at all institutions, additional automatic admissions at selected 
institutions, and 18 other socioeconomic factors that could be used in admission 
decisions.  The following sections detail each of these three items as contained in House 
Bill 588, as well as four other related parts of the bill.   
Automatic admission:  All Institutions 
 House Bill 588 requires that the state’s institutions of higher education 
automatically admit first-time freshman students who graduate in the top 10 percent of 
their high school class.  Students are entitled to automatic admission during the two years 
subsequent to their high school graduation.   
The institutions are further mandated to determine whether an applicant is in need 
of preparation for college-level work.  The bill allows institutions to require students to 
enroll in designated enrichment courses and orientation programs.  Students not found to 
need additional preparation may voluntarily enroll in the enrichment courses.       
Additional Automatic Admissions:  Selected Institutions 
 An optional automatic admission is provided for students graduating in the top 25 
percent of their high school graduating class.  Each academic year, the governing board 
of each institution must determine whether to adopt such a policy.    
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Other Admission 
 Institutions are required to consider the following socioeconomic factors for 
students who do not qualify for automatic admission: 
1.  the academic record of the applicant;  
2. the socioeconomic background, including the family’s household income, and the 
parents’ level of education; 
3. whether or not the applicant would be the first generation in the family to attend or 
graduate from college; 
4. the applicant’s bilingual proficiency; 
5. the financial rank of the applicant’s school district; 
6. the performance level of the applicant’s school as determined by the Texas Education 
Agency; 
7. the applicant’s responsibilities while attending schools, e.g., whether the applicant has 
been employed, helped raise children, or other such factors; 
8.   the region of residence; 
9. whether the applicant resides in a rural, urban, central city, or suburban area of the 
state;  
10. the applicant’s performance on standardized tests; 
11.  the applicant’s standardized tests performance compared to other students of similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds; 
12. whether the applicant’s school was under a court-ordered desegregation plan;  
13. community involvement; 
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14. extracurricular activities; 
15. the applicant’s interest in a specific field of study; 
16. personal interview; 
17. the applicant’s admission to an out-of-state institution; and  
18. any other factors deemed necessary by the institution. 
While an institution may consider additional factors, it must publish in its catalog 
a list of the factors it intends to use no later than one year before applications are first 
considered.  The law states that this section does not apply to institutions that have an 
open enrollment policy. 
Report to Coordinating Board 
To monitor the composition of each entering class of students, institutions are 
required to submit an annual report to the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.  
The report is to include a demographic breakdown including the race, ethnicity, and 
economic status of the students admitted. 
Rulemaking 
 Authority was granted to the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board to 
adopt rules relating to the operation of admissions programs, the identification of eligible 
students and the reporting requirements.    
Application of Admission Criteria to Other Programs 
 This section requires that institutions or medical and dental units offering 
admissions to undergraduate transfer students, graduates, postgraduates or professional 
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programs must adopt an admissions policy for their respective programs.  The policy 
must be published and available to the public.    
Scholarships and Fellowship Awards 
 An institution or unit offering scholarships or fellowships must adopt a policy 
describing the factors used in making an award.  The policy must be published and 
available to the public.    
    House Bill 588 regulations became effective in the fall term or first semester of 
1998.  
Analysis of Outcome 
Regarding House Bill 588 being signed by the governor, Senator Teel Bivins said 
in an interview:  
I think Irma and the minority members were very pleased that it passed.  But 
frankly, I do think that the Republicans were very pleased that it passed because it 
got at a social problem in a race-neutral fashion….I think the Democrats 
perceived that it accomplished a major advance for minority Texans.  And, I think 
Republicans agreed that it did.  But, it did so in a way that didn’t pit Brown 
against White or Black against White.  It did so in a race-neutral fashion.   
Echoing similar sentiments, Terrell Smith, the governor’s legislative director, said 
in an interview that everybody claimed victory.  He also noted:  
Obviously, Irma claimed victory, I don’t know necessarily for herself, but I think 
for her constituents and for minorities; but certainly we claimed—I think we in 
this office, and Governor Bush has a great claim to victory, and he has touted this 
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bill and the top 10 percent plan as a solution to a situation that we as Republicans 
can embrace as a way to make sure that there’s diversity and fairness in our 
universities…because we do it without looking at the color of your skin.  We look 
at your achievement.   
Representative Rangel also was proud of the accomplishment.  In an interview, 
she said that in: 
Twenty-three years, I have never been to a signing of any of my bills.  I went to 
this one.  And I had every member that contributed—the experts.  Michael Olivas 
was there.  David Montejano was there.  Gerald Torres was there.  All those who 
had contributed to the idea and drafting the bill were invited to be there.  I was not 
there by myself claiming glory or victory or anything else because it was those 
guys, those experts who had done it. 
One newspaper praised House Bill 588 for giving minorities a lift.  Though the 
paper didn’t consider the legislation a perfect fix:  
it definitely represents a constructive response to Hopwood.  And such a response 
is urgently needed…. If we don’t want to lose our brightest and best minority 
students to out-of-state colleges, more initiatives along the lines of Rangel’s will 
be essential.”  (“Living with Hopwood,” 1997, p. A18) 
In summary, the preceding findings show that three institutional forces were 
instrument in ensuring House Bill 588’s success:  Chairman Irma Rangel’s leadership, 
Chairman Teel Bivins’ support and the Democratic vote in the House.  It is clear that 
Rangel, as Chair of the House Higher Education Committee, successfully managed the 
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input provided by the major demand articulators.  Each of these groups and individuals 
participated in the legislative process by providing their personal or professional input in 
the development of House Bill 588.  As author of the bill, Rangel determined which input 
to accept.  When the bill was brought for a vote before the full House, the Democratic 
legislators were generally supportive of the bill.  Since a majority of the House members 
were Democrats, the bill passed.  Other characteristics such as the compositions of House 
legislative districts, tenure and gender had little to no affect on the final outcome of the 
vote, with the one exception of ethnicity because the majority of the minority legislators 
were Democrats.           
In contrast to the House experience, the bill received a majority of the votes in the 
Texas Senate from both Democrats and Republicans.  One reason is attributed to the fact 
that the Senate had already debated and passed Senate Bill 1419, which also intended to 
promote diversity in higher education.  It was speculated that senators may have also 
been influenced by the heterogeneity of the districts that they represent, which include a 
broader constituency due to their larger size, unlike state representatives whose districts 
are smaller and more likely to be homogeneous.  Finally, Rangel also gave credit to 
Bivins who provided critical leadership among his Republican Senate colleagues.  
The enacted version of House Bill 588 implemented a uniform admissions system 
in Texas where:  (1) automatic admission is granted to students in the top 10 percent of 
their graduating high school class; (2) an optional automatic admission is allowed for 
students graduating in the top 25 percent of their class; and (3) universities are provided a 
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list of socioeconomic factors to use in considering students not qualified for automatic 
admission. 
 
Research Question 4:  What key strategies did the author of House Bill 588 
implement to facilitate the development and passage of the bill? 
  Five key strategies used by State Representative Irma Rangel, author of House 
Bill 588, seemed potentially important to the bill’s approval.  Question four was designed 
to examine how these strategies aided in the passage of the bill, which was considered 
major innovative legislation in Texas.   
  When Rangel began working on a response to the Hopwood ruling, her proposed 
policy changes were highly political and strongly criticized.  Her recommendations were 
perceived to benefit some students to the disadvantage of others.  However, by the end of 
the session, Rangel had succeeded in enacting a new admissions policy.  For this 
enormous feat, the interview respondents identified Rangel as the champion of House 
Bill 588.   
  What made Rangel effective?  Interviewees identified the following factors:  
tenure in the legislature, chairmanship of the pivotal House committee, knowledge of 
how the system works, effective use of her power, influence over her colleagues, and 
understanding of parliamentary procedure.   
Senator Teel Bivins, Chairman of the Senate Education Committee, who worked 
with the representative for many years attributed Rangel’s success to some of the same 
reasons.  In an interview he said:  
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she’s been around the legislature for a long time and she knows how the system 
works.  She’s the chair of a committee and she knows how to use her power as the 
chair of that committee.  But also she used the skill basic of every good legislator, 
which is the ability to communicate in selling your ideas.”   
He added:  
It’s a marketplace for ideas.  And it’s competition to see who can sell their ideas.  
And she has some fairly persuasive skills.  And parliamentary procedure…she uses 
it well.  And then just her having been around here for a long time; she has good 
relationships and it’s a relationship business. 
When asked in an interview whether a less tenured legislator would have been as 
successful as Rangel, Terrell Smith, then-Governor Bush’s legislative director replied:  
It’d be hard.  Part of it is just that she’s been here a long time.  She’s fought many, 
many battles….And then everyone knew that she cared about the issue.  She cared 
greatly about the issue.  So you’d never know, and I’d like to think that the issues 
are bigger than the personalities, but the personalities up here mean a lot.  And, 
where a member with less experience perhaps would have messed up is in just 
knowing where to draw the line. 
Strategies 
As the above statements suggest, there were various factors that contributed to the 
development and success of House Bill 588.  However, from Rangel’s personal 
comments during an interview, as well as the interview comments from some of her 
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legislative colleagues and other participants, five well thought-out strategies emerged, 
which were focused on securing the passage of the bill.   
First, Rangel sought the advice of experts in the area of higher education.  In an 
interview she said “I had three different groups of meetings.”  She noted that one group 
included:  
 a meeting with Attorney General Dan Morales, along with Al Kauffman, who is 
the general counsel for the office of MALDEF in San Antonio, and myself.  The 
other group consisted of professor Gerald Torres, who at that time was associate 
dean of the law school in Austin, at The University of Texas in Austin, and 
Michael Olivas who is also a law professor at the University of Houston Law 
School, along with, in two of those meetings, I invited Terrell Smith to come as a 
representative of the governor.   
The third group consisted of Dr. Ricardo Romo, Vice Provost at The University of Texas 
at Austin; David Montejano, then-director of the Center for Mexican American Studies at 
The University of Texas at Austin; and Dr. Jorge Chapa, from the LBJ School.  
In an interview, Montejano said that in the small group meetings, just as he had 
done in the statewide forums, he shared his recommendation that universities be required 
to automatically admit all students in the top 10 percent of their high school graduating 
class.  He acknowledged that he had gotten this idea from a policy previously practiced at 
The University of Texas.  Montejano speculated that perhaps the University did away 
with this policy because they wanted “a more holistic admission process.”  But he stated 
that since admissions policies were an administrative decision, the University could have 
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easily reenacted the “top 10 percent plan.”  He also understood that fear of being blamed 
for circumventing the Hopwood ruling may have inhibited their decision making.  No 
matter what reasons caused the University to abandon this policy, he said that the top 10 
percent policy made a great deal of sense to him.  He believed that students who have 
“proven themselves over three or four years in high school…should have a chance to 
come to UT Austin.” 
During these meetings, Montejano advocated that this plan would maintain 
diversity in higher education.  He would say: “this is going to work because of the 
geographic concentration and segregation of Mexicanos and Blacks in the State.”   In 
justifying his premise to the group, he noted that:  
We didn’t really know what the level of segregation is in this state.  So, I said let’s 
assume that it’s 50 percent segregated.  In other words, if 50 percent of the 
Mexicanos go to segregated schools, 50 percent of the Blacks go to segregated 
schools.  What would that mean in terms of a top 10 percent plan if it was in effect 
today? …. If everybody came who I thought could come, we would easily double 
the numbers [of minority students]. 
Recognizing that any inaccuracy would discredit House Bill 588, Rangel did not 
accept his speculation.  She knew that hard data was needed if she expected to convince 
her colleagues in the Legislature.   In an interview, Montejano added that Rangel told 
him:  “I want the real numbers.  Show me the real numbers.  This sounds very good, but I 
want the real numbers.  Go out and do the research and come back.” 
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Kauffman also shared his solution to the Hopwood ruling.  In an interview, 
Montejano, who participated in the smaller group meetings, stated that:  
Al Kauffman presented a 15 variable plan.  All these variables have to be 
considered in admissions.  None of them have to do with race, but they have to do 
with things like: Are you bilingual?  Did you work your way through school?  Do 
you come from a low-income family?  Are you the first generation to go to 
college? 
Input provided by both Montejano and Kauffman—who were actively involved in 
devising a solution to Hopwood  and adamant about their proposals—was accepted by 
Rangel.  In fact, these two recommendations became primary components of House Bill 
588.  When the draft of the bill was approved by everybody attending the meetings, 
Rangel filed the bill in the Texas House of Representatives.  That day was January 21, 
1997, about one week after the 75th Legislature had convened.  
The second strategy that Rangel identified as critical was to ensure that the 
governor’s office would support the bill.  Rangel stated in an interview, “I knew that was 
going to be the last step to be taken, that it [House Bill 588] had to be signed by the 
governor….I was trying to follow the process,” she said. 
In an interview, Terrell Smith said that he was the governor’s liaison with the 
members of the Texas House of Representative and the Texas Senate and that some five 
to seven months before the 75th Legislature convened, Representative Irma Rangel and 
others were dealing with the effects of the Hopwood decision that had recently been 
handed down.  He also confirmed that Rangel set up a series of meetings in her office 
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with people from her district, university professors, and others.  He said, “she called and 
asked that I go down and attend.  And so I just went mostly as an observer from the 
governor’s office to her office and listened in on the kind of things they were tossing 
around.” 
Smith believed that Rangel had the confidence to call on him because of their past 
relationship.  He had served as a member of the Texas Legislature with her for about 10 
years.  Smith figured that she was:  
just checking with me to see what the governor could go along with; to know if he 
was willing to work with them and stuff like that.  And I think, during that period 
of time, we pretty well just kind of kept the doors open.  We didn’t commit to any 
particular plan….[O]ne of the things that I was especially interested in, and I 
think the governor was, in fact, I know the governor was, that whatever we do be 
race-neutral. 
The invitation to include someone from the opposing political party, however, 
was met with some criticism.  When asked by some of her small focus group members 
about why she invited someone from the governor’s office, Rangel replied, “because in 
my twenty some-odd years here, I discovered that a governor can veto bills!”  
While there was agreement that the governor did not play an active role in the 
enactment of House Bill 588, his passive affirmation of the legislation was valued.  A key 
staff member who closely monitored the development of the bill said, “the governor’s 
role was limited.”  The staff member added that the governor was initially:  
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neutral on the issue and wasn’t going to address it.  I think after, at the urging of 
some of the University chancellors and Representative Rangel, ultimately he did 
give his assent to [House Bill] 588 and said that he would not veto it, and in fact 
would sign it.  While it wasn’t strong support necessarily, it was the support 
necessary to get the bill through.  
  The third strategy used by Rangel was to keep the bill simple.  Numerous 
respondents recognized this strategy as a primary reason House Bill 588 received more 
support than similar legislation.  In an interview, Smith stressed the importance of this 
decision.  He said “I think she recognized that it had to be fairly simple to understand.”  
Unlike the Senate plan that was introduced, Smith noted, “I just remember it was like 10 
percent this and 20 percent that, and just all kinds of things that we didn’t care for.”       
Senate Bill 1419 was filed on March 13, 1997, almost two months after House 
Bill 588, and was known as the “50, 40, 10” percent plan.  The co-authors of the Senate 
bill included Senators West, Barrientos, and Bivins. 
In trying to gain the House Higher Education Chairman’s support for the Senate 
bill, Senator West called Chairman Irma Rangel.  In an interview, Rangel recalled, “I was 
called by Senator West to his office, and he asked me to support the 50, 40, 10 plan.”  
Though she said to him that she would look at his bill, she noted, “I did not commit to the 
50, 40, 10 because the 50, 40, 10 was very confusing.  It was not going to have a clear-cut 
chance of being implemented easily with everybody recognizing what was going to be 
done.”  Rangel said that the top 10 percent students “were going to be lost in the group 
consisting of the 50 percent and in the group consisting of the 40 percent,” and the bill 
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“would probably have some loopholes that would allow a lot of opportunities for the 
circumventing of this bill.”  On the contrary, she said “our bill was very simple.  It just 
said the top 10 percent, period, of every high school in the State of Texas, were going to 
be automatically admitted without consideration as to the scores on their SAT or the 
ACT.”   
As Chair of the Higher Education Committee, Rangel made the decision to hold 
back the Senate bill.  The House Rules state that “[t]he chairs of committees determine if 
and when a bill will be considered, although they are required to consult with the 
committee members on the work schedule and the order of consideration of matters 
before the committee” (House Research Organization, 1999, p. 3).  Rangel stated in an 
interview, “I sat on the 50, 40, 10 bill…. I wanted a very simple bill that the universities 
could understand exactly what they had to do.” 
A member of Senator Barrientos’ senior staff who was analyzing the bill also 
agreed that Senate Bill 1419 was overly complex.  The staffer said:  
the Senate had drafted an alternative to the companion to House Bill 588.  The 
Senate kind of basically went off on a whole different track…using the same 
basic idea and concepts contained within [House Bill] 588 but actually it was 
much more complex; it had a three tier system as opposed to a two-tier system 
with automatic admissions and, lots of exceptions and things that, really, just 
made it a very difficult bill to understand and to administer, so we wasted some 
time in the Senate negotiating that bill.  We wasted some time in the Senate 
seeking to appease many different people.  And that’s mainly because of the 
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political makeup, many more conservatives in the Senate who were unwilling to 
accept a strong alternative to affirmative action.…It was highly controversial. 
Rangel’s fourth strategy was to make House Bill 588 a priority in order to 
overcome the hurdles that lay ahead for this legislation.  To become law, the bill would 
have to pass through various parliamentary procedures and political obstacles.  It was 
particularly subject to a tremendous time constraint.  In Texas, the Constitution provides 
for biennial sessions, beginning in January of odd-numbered years.  These sessions run 
for a maximum of 140 days.  This schedule does not allow sufficient time for legislators 
to thoroughly consider each bill, and it is often the case that bills pushed by the 
legislative leadership receive most of the attention (Kraemer et al., 1996).   
During the 75th Legislature, over 3,600 bills were filed in the Texas House of 
Representatives (House Research Organization, 1997c).  As Chair of the House Higher 
Education Committee, Rangel decided to devote her time to House Bill 588.  But it was 
not a decision she made easily since she had filed numerous bills addressing other aspects 
of higher education that her group of experts had identified as being at risk.  
For example, one of those other bills dealt with the use of race in admissions 
policies.  According to the Hopwood case, “the word race can still be used in certain 
instances where we can show that there is still present discrimination by our universities” 
said Rangel in an interview.  But she was not optimistic about its success.  In related 
testimony, Rangel had learned that it would be “very difficult to show that these 
universities are still exercising acts of discrimination as they existed in the past.”  
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Another bill that Rangel had a particularly difficult time deciding to let languish 
was her indemnification bill.  This bill would have indemnified university officials in the 
event they were sued for their participation in an admissions matter.  Rangel recalled “we 
did not get that indemnification bill passed either” because she was told that present law 
“will indemnify its [the State’s] agent from any lawsuit”.  But, we were concerned about 
students who are not agents of the State because students also serve on some admissions 
committees.”  She said she was proud that she “got it passed on the House floor, but we 
just never got it on the Senate.  So we said, okay, fine.”  
Knowing the legislative process and understanding the influences of the political 
climate within the Legislature, she knew it was time for a new plan.  There would not be 
enough time to continue fighting a battle on each bill.  She had to restrategize.  She met 
with her group of experts and told them “look, we’ve got too many bills.  This is a very 
short session….we are going to have to give priority to the most important bill.  In my 
opinion, the most important bill is 588.”  And while she remained somewhat agreeable to 
fight for the other bills as well, she warned the group “there are sixty-some Republicans.  
All of us are Democrats.  And all of them are going to say, hey, wait a minute, they 
[minority students] are going to come in and invade our universities. What’s going to 
happen to the spaces that our kids had?”  So, again she emphasized, “let’s be realistic.  
We’ve got a chance for one bill.  Which one are we going to go with?”   In the end, the 
consensus was to focus all energies on House Bill 588.   
Finally, Rangel’s fifth strategy was to exercise her power as Chair of the House 
Higher Education Committee.  Before any piece of education legislation could be 
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considered by either chamber, it had to be passed out of both the House and Senate 
education committees.  The Senate Education Committee was chaired by Senator Teel 
Bivins, a Republican from Amarillo.  Rangel, as Chair of the House Higher Education 
Committee, recognized that both she and Chairman Bivins had ambitious legislative 
agendas; therefore, both had to work with one another since their bills had to pass out of 
each other’s committees.  Otherwise, a bill would never get the chance to be considered 
by the entire legislative body.   
Exercising the power inherent in her position as Chair of the House Higher 
Education Committee proved to be one of her greatest resources, particularly in working 
with Bivins.  A couple of staff members who observed Rangel closely during the session 
noted in an interview that while she was often perceived as a “sweet” person, she was, in 
reality, equally “tough.”  In an interview, another staff member recalled that while trying 
to work things out with Bivins, “she was very shrewd.  She used her power as chair to 
leverage his support and did an excellent job of that.”  Bivins also acknowledged the 
power that Rangel held as Chair of the House Public Education Committee.  In an 
interview, while discussing his relationship with Chairman Rangel, Chairman Bivins 
mentioned the times when he would depend on the “good graces” of his counterpart in 
the House.  He stated that when:  
there are some things that are real important to me that she may not like a whole 
lot, I will go over on bended knee and plead with her to pass my stuff.  And there 
are some things that I may not like that much that I know she’s interested in, so 
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that provides the basis for the cornerstone of democratic process, which is 
compromise. 
This relationship ensured significant compromises from both chairs during the  
75th Legislature.  Regarding House Bill 588, Bivins said, “that wasn’t particularly the 
case here” because he knew that both Houses were working on a solution.  He said, “it 
was something that I believe in, that I needed to do.” 
However, Rangel became concerned when House Bill 588 failed to receive the 
immediate attention she thought it deserved when it first arrived in the Senate Education 
Committee.  In fact, she felt the need to remind Bivins of whose bill he was failing to act 
on.  In an interview, Rangel said:  “I called him and I asked him if he would come to my 
office.”  Once he arrived, she recalled being very firm with him.  According to Rangel, 
they had the following discussion:   
Senator…I drive a Jaguar, I have a very nice home, but my most valuable asset is 
my independence.  And my independence is because of my education.  I said, I’d 
like to see many students, minority students, be able to exercise their 
independence too.  They can’t do it unless they get a good education.  He stopped 
me right away:  “Now wait a minute…I agree with you.  I’m with you.”  I said, 
why haven’t we had a hearing on our bill?  So we are going to have a hearing on 
our bill?  I said, well, good, because you know, I have a couple of your bills too.  
I’m sure you want a hearing.  But students out there want that too. 
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Rangel said that Bivins assured her that House Bill 588 would received a public hearing 
in the Senate.  Interestingly, while Rangel was pushing hard to have her bill heard in the 
Senate, she was “sitting on” Senate Bill 1419, which Senator Bivins had co-authored.  
Commenting on whether Rangel was pressured by the Senate for holding up their 
bill, Terrell Smith, the governor’s legislative director said in an interview:  “Probably.  
But if you’ve followed Irma at all over the years, she’s killed their bills right and left, and 
I think they’ve learned that pressuring her doesn’t do a whole lot of good.”   
When asked in an interview whether she received any pressure from senators for 
holding back their bills, Rangel said, “nobody complained.  I guess if they did, they knew 
it would be worthless anyway.”    
Bivins and Smith both confirmed that Rangel took the position that House Bill 
588 would be the response to Hopwood.  Bivins commented that the, “Senate Bill passed 
and went over to the House.  She substituted it with her bill…the bottom line was, hers 
was the vehicle.”  Smith agreed.  He noted:  
I really think that as a result, they [senators] gave up.  Actually, I was a little 
surprised at how easy they gave up on the 50-40-10 plan….I really thought we 
were going to have to go to battle.  I thought it was going to be, us and Irma, 
against some of the senators, and then trying to get some compromise to do this or 
that.   
Smith added, “I’m not sure about how she did it; the Senate just accepted her deal and 
took it without any changes at all, which in my opinion is rather unusual.” 
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Rangel also found herself having to rely on her position as Chair to maintain unity 
between minority groups.  She said there was an African-American legislator who filed a 
similar bill.  In an interview, Rangel said that:       
Her number was higher than mine and I don’t understand why she filed that…. I 
called this member in and I said: “You have the identical bill that I filed before 
you did.  I’m not going to squabble over this because the students need all our 
votes.” 
Rangel also said that she told this legislator, “I’m going to sit on your bill.  I’m not going 
to bring it up for a hearing.  I will put your name as a co-author on my bill.”  Rangel 
added:  
I put that member as a co-author, not co-sponsor, but a co-author of my bill, our 
bill—so that we would not divide ourselves.  I knew that the students were going 
to need the votes of the African-Americans and every vote that we could.  And I 
was not about to bring about any divisiveness amongst our votes.   
Though a bill normally has one primary author, the House Rules permit a maximum of 
four additional joint authors, which then gives these members co-ownership of the bill.  
Rangel allowed four other House members to take such ownership.  
In summary, the respondents identified the Chairman of the House Higher 
Education Committee, Irma Rangel, as the key legislative stakeholder.  Not only did she 
author House Bill 588, but she successfully navigated its enactment.  The evidence shows 
that she did this by exercising considerable leadership, managing conflict and building 
consensus while implementing numerous strategies to get through the complex rules and 
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the power structures that are a basic part of the legislative process.  These strategies 
included:  seeking the advice of experts in the field of higher education; involving the 
governor’s office from the beginning of the process; keeping the bill simple; making 
House Bill 588 her priority; and exercising her power as Chair of the House Public 
Education Committee. 
Not explicitly stated, but clearly important, was the fact that choosing the top 10 
percent created an admissions system based on merit (i.e., high level student 
performance), which was an attractive element in the race-neutral debate.  Also of 
interest was that inequality of school performance did not become an issue during the 
legislative discussions.  Such discussions if highly visible might have proven awkward 
for legislators.  Some would have had to claim that their schools were better than others 
in the State, giving their students perhaps an unfair advantage.  Others with under-
performing schools might have been put in the position of having to aggressively 
advocate for a better public school system in their districts.  Most important, any 
discussion of these matters could have returned the legislature to the 1990’s struggle 
when the Texas Supreme Court required that the State devise an equitable public school 
finance system.  It took Texas legislators about five years to develop an acceptable plan 










SUMMARY, INTERPRETATION, CONCLUSION, AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
 
Summary of the Key Findings 
Review of the legislative testimony, documents, and interview data confirms that 
the 75th Texas Legislature assumed an unprecedented role in higher education admissions 
policies.  The data reveal that:  
• The Hopwood ruling and Attorney General Morales’ subsequent interpretation 
influenced the Texas legislature to respond to the issue of minority 
representation in higher education.  
• Senator Gonzalo Barrientos initiated statewide discussions to address the 
affects of the ruling. 
• Minority legislators perceived the anticipated affects of the Hopwood ruling to 
be negative and sought legislative redress. 
• Four primary groups, identified as the major demand articulators, provided 
lawmakers with legislative input on the development of House Bill 588.  
• Past controversy over affirmative action policies thrust lawmakers into a 
partisan debate over admissions legislation. 
• Some concessions had to be made to facilitate the acceptance of House Bill 
588. 
• The three institutional forces within the Texas legislature that were 
instrumental in the success of the bill were: the initiative and leadership of 
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Chairman Irma Rangel, Chairman Teel Bivins’ support, and the control held 
by Democrats in the House. 
• The success of House Bill 588 was further dependent on the skillful utilization 
of five key strategic maneuvers by Rangel. 
• Admitting the top 10 percent of each high school graduating class was an 
acceptable alternative to the traditional use of race in higher education 
admissions policies.   
It is worth noting that House Bill 588 did not address admissions to professional 
schools except that entry into undergraduate institutions is the key step to success in 
admission to professional schools.  Rangel understood this link and worked hard during 
the 75th Legislature to ensure that entry into higher education was accessible at the entry 
level—the undergraduate schools.  In an interview, Rangel said that the Hopwood ruling 
was “going to affect everybody,” beginning at the undergraduate level.  Therefore, House 
Bill 588 focused on the undergraduate level. 
 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 
In 1997, the Texas Legislature enacted House Bill 588 in its response to the 
Hopwood  ruling that banned the use of affirmative action policies at The University of 
Texas School of Law.  This legislation is an alternative to the traditional use of race in 
university admissions decisions.  It guarantees automatic admission to state universities 
for the top 10 percent of each state high school graduating class.  
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This study focused on the actions of the 75th Legislature and was guided by 
Meranto’s (1967) systems model that he created to identify the factors that lead to the 
passage of major legislation.  The model was designed to show how these factors enter a 
political system as inputs and are then are altered within the system to produce an output, 
or an innovative legislative solution to a societal problem.  Meranto referred to his model 
as an input-output systems model. 
Meranto (1967) used his model to examine a federal legislative issue, whereas 
this study examined the enactment of state legislation at a specific point in time.  Meranto 
was able to identify the various factors that blocked previous attempts to enact legislation 
securing federal aid to education.  His model guided this study in highlighting the factors 
that influenced the 75th Texas Legislature to produce a new output, House Bill 588.   
This study identified multiple factors to explain the successful enactment of 
House Bill 588.  Therefore, it is consistent with Meranto’s (1967) finding, and 
observation that:  
victory must be viewed in the context of several inextricably interrelated 
factors….it is not possible to rank them systematically in order of importance in 
any meaningful fashion.  Indeed, it would be a mistake to attempt such a ranking 
since it would imply a simplified conception of the complex interaction among 
the factors that made the passage of the proposal possible.  All are necessary to 
explain the outcome; no single variable is sufficient.  (p. 131)      
Following is an examination of the external and internal factors that influenced the 
passage of House Bill 588 and how they fit Meranto’s model.    
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Conditions Outside the Texas Legislature 
This study illustrated that three conditions outside the Texas Legislature 
influenced the 75th Legislature to address the issue of diversity in education.  The three 
conditions were, the Hopwood ruling, former Attorney General Dan Morales’ subsequent 
interpretation of the ruling, and the projected demographic changes in the population of 
Texas.  These conditions helped to determine the environment in which the political 
system functioned and created input demands primarily through minority legislators, who 
anticipated the adverse affects of the Hopwood ruling on minority representation in 
higher education.  The conditions also spawned “major demand articulators,” the second 
subcategory of Meranto’s (1967) model.  Included were the four groups that provided 
legislators with various sources of legislative input:  interest groups, private 
citizens/constituents, state agency legislative liaisons (university representatives), and 
political parties. 
The Hopwood ruling created a new environment in which universities were 
banned from using race as a factor in admissions decisions.  This new environment began 
taking shape in 1992 when four White students filed a lawsuit against The University of 
Texas School of Law claiming reverse discrimination.  In 1994, a federal judge ruled that 
the specific guidelines employed by The University of Texas School of Law’s admissions 
process—separately evaluating non minority and minority applicants—was 
unconstitutional, but held that affirmative action was still a valid principle to use in 
admissions.  In 1995, the plaintiffs appealed.  In 1996, a three-judge panel of the U.S. 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the University 
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to revise its admissions policy.  After some deliberation, the State appealed the decision 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.  However, the Court voted to leave intact the federal appeals 
court ruling banning the use of race-based admissions policies at the law school, other 
than to remedy past cases of discrimination.               
Confusion over the implementation of the ruling resulted in another new input 
factor:  Morales’ interpretation of the ruling.  In 1996, he provided all state universities 
guidelines for establishing race-neutral policies in admissions and financial aid.  
In their efforts to comply with the ruling and the State’s interpretation, some 
institutions began to modify their admissions procedures by eliminating their race-based 
policies.  Other universities pressed Morales for further clarification of the case; they 
sought guidance on how they could maintain a diverse student body in light of the new 
restrictions.  In Letter Opinion No. 97-001, Morales (1997) responded by formalizing his 
previous position against the use of race-base institutional policies and added that this 
restriction applied to “admissions, financial aid, scholarships, fellowships, recruitment 
and retention, among others” (p. 24).       
Given the guidelines, various campuses began reporting a drop in minority 
applications and admissions rates.  Statistics on the first post-Hopwood freshman class 
showed a decline in admissions to the two major institutions of higher education in the 
State, The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University.  This concerned 
minority legislators because the drop was in direct contrast to the rising number of 
minority students in Texas.   
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Dr. Steve Murdock, chief demographer of the Texas State Data Center at Texas 
A&M University, had reported to the Legislature that the minority population would 
account for more than 50 percent of the total population of Texas by the year 2030.  This 
projected demographic change proved to be a third critical input factor in the equation.   
Fortunately for advocates of the “top 10 percent” proposal, one possible opponent 
to House Bill 588 was influenced by Murdock’s projections.  Republican Senator Teel 
Bivins, Chairman of the Senate Education Committee, understood what Murdock was 
saying about the future implications of an undereducated student population.  In an 
interview, Bivins acknowledged the impact of the demographic shifts on the State’s 
educational, cultural, and social structure, “[u]nless we on our watch are able to open up 
education to that sector of the population.”  
Bivins’ support was a key component in the success of the bill, given the political 
climate that controlled the 75th Legislature.  The 75th Legislature was elected in 1996 and 
produced the first Republican Senate majority.12  The Senate had 17 Republicans and 14 
Democrats.  The House maintained a Democratic majority with 82 Democrats to 68 
Republicans (Texas House Directory, 1997).  The Republican governor, of course, held 
veto power.  This posed a challenge for Democrats because the Republican Party in 
Texas tended to be strongly conservative, and conservatives were likely to oppose 
affirmative action policies (Kraemer et al., 1996).  A local newspaper reporter observed 
                                                 
 116
12 “[B]y 1995 Texas was clearly a two-party state.  Republicans held more than 1,000 offices 
statewide….[while] Democrats still held…17 of the 31 state Senate seats, [and] 89 of the 150 seats in the 
state House” (Kraemer et al., 1996, p. 143).  
that “[m]inority lawmakers appear headed for a showdown with some Republican 
lawmakers over how to respond to the court ruling” (Brooks, 1997a, p. A1).              
These input factors entered the legislative system through key minority legislative 
leaders who perceived the adverse affects of the Hopwood ruling.  These leaders 
committed to finding a solution that would promote diversity in higher education, and 
worked with education interest groups, various private citizens and state agency 
legislative liaisons.  For example, Senator Gonzalo Barrientos initiated statewide forums 
that at times included over 100 participants.  Barrientos also invited State Representative 
Irma Rangel, Chair of the House Higher Education Committee, to join the discussions.  
Rangel’s participation helped focus the public support Barrientos had created.  She 
organized smaller discussion groups in her Capitol office, which led to the drafting of 
House Bill 588.   
Aroused public opinion and the resulting response by legislative leaders and 
others was sufficient to generate support for remedial legislation.  This finding supports 
research by Schattschneider (1960) who found that, “conflict, competition, leadership, 
and organization are the essence of democratic politics.  Inherent in the operations of a 
democracy are special conditions which permit large numbers of people to function” (p. 
139).  Schattschneider further asserts that “[a] popular decision bringing into focus the 
force of public support requires a tremendous effort to define the alternatives, to organize 
the discussion and mobilize opinion.  The government and the political organizations are 
in the business of manufacturing this kind of alternatives” (p. 139).         
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Consequently, when the 75th Legislature convened, these converging input efforts 
resulted in the introduction of over 20 bills aimed at curtailing the anticipated adverse 
affects of the Hopwood ruling.  These new proposals addressed various university 
admissions procedures, increased financial aid, parity studies, and indemnification for 
admissions officers. Though some of these bills were race-based, most were not.  House 
Bill 588 was among the race-neutral legislation.  The avoidance of race-based solutions 
was due to the strong Republican opposition to any legislation that was not race-neutral.  
Early in the session, the Chairman of the Senate Education Committee had made it clear 
that only race-neutral legislation would receive consideration in his committee. 
Conditions Within the Texas Legislature 
Meranto (1967) notes that the environmental conditions may appear to produce 
new policy outputs.  But, he says:  “External changes do not automatically bring about 
innovation in the system and in its policy outputs for the simple reason that the 
institutional structure of the system is rigged against producing change” (p. 110).  Texas 
is a good example.  To become law in Texas, a bill has several hurdles to overcome.  A 
bill requires the approval of both the Senate and the House.  It has to be read three 
separate times in each chamber.  During the first reading, the bill is introduced and 
referred to the committee of the presiding officers’ recommendation.  The second reading 
takes place after the bill has been heard and favorably reported back to the respective 
chamber.  At that time, the bill is debated and could be amended by a majority vote prior 
to being passed to third reading.  On third reading the bill is debated again and could be 
amended once more by a two-thirds vote prior to final passage (House Research 
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Organization, 1999).  Upon final passage, the bill still must escape the governor’s veto.  
For example, in 2001 the Texas Legislature enacted 1,601 bills and 20 joint resolutions 
after considering over 5,700 pieces of legislation.  The governor vetoed 82 bills (House 
Research Organization, 2001).     
Additional institutional factors affect legislative outcomes.  In Texas, regular 
sessions are held biennially in odd-numbered years for 140 days.  These short sessions do 
not allow legislators to study carefully each piece of legislation, which serves to heighten 
the power of the presiding officers (Kraemer et al., 1996).  Significant for this study was 
the fact that neither Democratic Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock, the presiding officer 
of the Texas Senate, nor Democratic Speaker Pete Laney, the presiding officer of the 
Texas House of Representatives, appear to have taken an official position on the 
development of House Bill 588.  However, that does not mean that they did not play a 
critical role in the process.  Their decision to play a passive role amounted to tacit 
acceptance, leaving the fate of the bill to efforts of other legislative leaders.  This had a 
significant impact on the outcome of the bill because “the lieutenant governor and the 
speaker of the House have such sweeping procedural, organizational, administrative, and 
planning authority that [if they choose] they truly dominate the legislative scene” 
(Kraemer et al., 1996, p. 220).   
The outcome of House Bill 588 was determined primarily by a group of key 
legislative leaders within the Texas Legislature that included committee chairs who were 
successful in their efforts to get the issue of minority representation in higher education 
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on the State’s policy agenda.  This was especially true in the House where Democrats 
held control.   
Representative Irma Rangel was Chair of the House Higher Education 
Committee, which meant that House Bill 588 would receive favorable consideration in 
her committee.  Once out of committee, the bill received favorable treatment by the 
Democrats in the House, who provided the majority vote needed to send the bill to the 
Senate.  Advocates would also count on Senate passage of the bill because of the 
influence of Senator Bivins, Chair of the Senate Education Committee, who had a good 
working relationship with Rangel and understood the ramifications of an undereducated 
population.  The combination of these conditions made it likely that a bill would be 
passed.   
While there appeared to be no unified opposition to House Bill 588, the bill’s 
enactment was not without conflict.  In the committee hearings, testimony included 
demands for increasing the automatic admissions cap from 10 percent to 25 percent and 
adding a financial component.  In other testimony, state agency legislative liaisons 
(university representatives) recommended changes because of the perceived affect of the 
legislation on their respective institutions.  Some Republican legislators expressed 
concern that home-schooled students were being excluded from the automatic admissions 
provision of the bill.  Others contended that students attending high performing high 
schools would be adversely affected by the bill because slots would indiscriminately be 
given to students from lower performing schools who were in the top 10 percent of their 
high school graduating class.  While Rangel acknowledged the relevance of some of their 
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arguments, she remained steadfast in her commitment to provide students from all parts 
of Texas an equal opportunity to pursue a higher education.            
Conservative-Republican influence in the legislature presented Rangel with a 
monumental task.  Rising to the challenge, Rangel incorporated a series of strategies in 
building support for House Bill 588.  First, she sought the advice of prominent leaders in 
public discussions of ways to remedy the affects of the Hopwood ruling and had them 
assist in drafting the bill.  This is consistent with the findings by Keefe et al. (1986) that 
legislators customarily seek the input of lobbyists.  Rangel sought the advice of 
educational interest groups and professionals in the area of higher education, although 
most were not registered lobbyists.  Second, she included the governor’s office 
throughout the entire process to ensure that the governor would support the bill.  Third, 
she drafted a bill that was simple to understand and simple to implement.  Fourth, she 
made House Bill 588 her legislative priority.  Though she had introduced various bills 
addressing other effects of the Hopwood ruling, the time constraints of a legislative 
session, in conjunction with the different stages that a bill must go through to become 
law, would not allow her to devote adequate time to the other bills.  Finally, she 
effectively utilized her power as Chair of the House Higher Education Committee in 
leveraging the support of Chairman Bivins and her other colleagues. These strategies 
increased the acceptability of the bill and led to its success.      
How significant was the House Democratic vote and party affiliation in the 
passage of the bill?  The roll-call vote was reflective of the House members’ party 
affiliations and clearly indicated that the Democratic vote helped secure the passage of 
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House Bill 588 in the Texas House of Representatives.  During the second reading of the 
bill, 72 of the 78 Democratic members present voted in support of the bill—five opposed 
the bill, one was present but not voting, and four were absent.  Of the 68 Republican 
members, only five voted for the bill.  A recorded vote was not available on third reading.  
However, the Democratic majority secured the bill’s final passage in the House.   
In an interview, Rangel said that perhaps Republicans voted against the bill 
“because they say it as another affirmative action program.”  The Republican vote was 
consistent with findings in the literature that a conservative ideology opposes government 
policies that promote affirmative action (Kraemer et al., 1996).  Likewise, Democratic 
legislators, most of whom were liberal, demonstrated strong and almost unified support 
for the bill because it would accomplish their goal, which was to ensure equal access to 
higher education.  
The study did not uncover any systematic evidence of election district (voters) 
influence on the legislators of the 75th Legislature and their votes on House Bill 588.  Nor 
was it feasible to conduct a detailed analysis to explain individual votes on House Bill 
588, primarily because there was a lack of data on the composition of each district. 
Some evidence was found to support Meranto’s (1967) suggestion that voting 
behavior may be explained, in part, by a legislator’s “perception of his constituency’s 
attitudes on the question” (p. 42).  Such behavior was evident during the House floor 
debate.  One Republican legislator asked his fellow colleagues to consider how this bill 
would affect their district and their constituency.  Another Republican legislator opposed 
the bill because of what he perceived to be the effect of the bill on the top performing 
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schools in his district.  A third Republican legislator expressed opposition because the bill 
excluded home-schooled students, whom he considered an important part of his 
constituency.  A similar behavior was found among the African-American and Mexican-
American legislators who voted for House Bill 588 because they represented 
constituencies with a majority of minority voters that would benefit from the bill.  While 
all African-American legislators voted for the bill, the only Mexican-American legislator 
who did not vote for the bill was Republican and had a district with an 8.9 percent 
Hispanic population (Mexican American Legislative Caucus Directory, 1997).  
Tenure appeared to be insignificant in a legislator’s vote on House Bill 588.  
Consistent with Davidson’s (1969) research, legislators with low seniority were more 
likely to vote the party line.  While some legislators with greater seniority did not follow 
party preference, most did vote along party lines.  This second finding neither confirms or 
rejects Davidson’s research.   
Turner and Schneier (1970) say that legislators are interested in re-election, and 
their vote reflects the preferences of their constituents and their political party.  The 
findings of this study are not inconsistent with their prediction.   
It was not evident that gender had any impact on the House vote.  For both men 
and women, party was the primary determinant of their vote. 
The influence of ethnicity on the vote was evident.  All Democratic African-
American and most Mexican-American legislators voted for the bill.  Only one minority 
member was Republican, a Republican Mexican-American.  This legislator’s vote on the 
House floor was similar to that of fellow party members.  However, in committee, as a 
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member of the House Higher Education Committee, this legislator supported the bill in 
order to enable it to reach the floor with the expectation that it would pass.  As might be 
expected, the vote of the members of the two minority caucuses, the Texas Legislative 
Black Caucus and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus, was similar to that of the 
ethnic minority vote mentioned above.  All members of the Texas Legislative Black 
Caucus supported the bill and the majority of the Mexican American Legislative Caucus 
members supported the bill.  It is also important to note that the 41 Democratic minority 
legislators composed over 50 percent of the Democratic vote in support of House Bill 
588.  Since the overwhelming majority of Democrats and Republicans voted along party 
lines, the data suggest that party affiliation was a principal influence in the vote on House 
Bill 588 for most legislators.          
Contrary to the division vote in the House that was primarily along party lines, the 
Senate passed the bill on second reading by a 27-4 vote.  On third reading, the bill passed 
by a similar vote.  Considering that the Senate had already debated and passed Senate Bill 
1419, a three-tiered bill also aimed at promoting diversity in higher education, it is not 
too surprising that House Bill 588 moved through the Senate process in record time.  
House Bill 588 was received by the Senate on April 17, 1997 and scheduled for a 
public hearing in the Senate Education Committee on April 30, 1997.  It was reported out 
favorably without amendments.  On May 8, the bill had its second and third reading and 
passed by a majority vote of the full Senate.  It was sent to the governor, who signed the 
bill on May 20.  The bill became effective September 1, 1997. 
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The road to success for House Bill 588 in the Senate was prepared by Senate Bill 
1419, co-authored by African-American Senator Royce West, Mexican-American 
Senator Gonzalo Barrientos, and Senator Teel Bivins.  Efforts to win support for Senate 
Bill 1419 in the Senate settled controversial issues such as funding and the race-neutral 
language.  These efforts along with extensive negotiations and compromises led to the 
acceptance of Senate Bill 1419, which was then sent over to the House.   
The Senate bill, however, was not to prevail in the House for several reasons.  The 
House bill was filed earlier, in January, about two months before the Senate bill.  In 
addition, the House bill provisions were simpler and won support more easily.  Rangel 
was also crucial to the success of House Bill 588.  She had secured support from the key 
legislative leaders in both chambers.  In addition, she got a commitment that the governor 
would not veto the bill.  Finally, as Chair of the House Education Committee, she 
effectively made the case that the Senate version was less desirable, and her Senate 
colleagues did not challenge her on this.  Rather, during the Senate committee hearing, 
House Bill 588 was described by Barrientos, the bill’s Senate sponsor, as a “kinder and 
gentler” bill than its Senate cousin.  
Senator Bivins also contributed to the Senate’s adoption of House Bill 588.  
While keeping firm to his position of race-neutral legislation, Bivins, as Chairman of the 
Senate Education Committee and as a member of the Republican Party, provided the 
essential leadership to remind his colleagues that the State of Texas had a responsibility 
to address the issue of diversity in higher education.  He sat down with legislators upset 
over the loss of affirmative action and was able to keep the focus on a solution that would 
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appease not only the legislative membership, but also the courts.  He also provided a 
cooperative environment for House Bill 588 while it was under consideration in his 
committee.  Most important, he utilized his knowledge of the Senate rules and called a 
point of order on an unfriendly amendment that was certain to defeat the bill on the 
Senate floor.  
Finally, Terrell Smith, a former legislator and the governor’s legislative director 
during the 75th Legislature, indicated that senators were more likely to vote for House 
Bill 588 because of the larger size of their legislative districts.  In an interview, he said 
that Senators have districts with “not just more minorities perhaps, but poor school 
districts, rich school districts, small school districts, big school districts, and they 
[senators] tend to come to the legislature feeling that all of those need to be represented.”  
Texas is divided into 31 state Senate districts and 150 state House districts.  The 
boundaries are defined using population and census data reported every 10 years.  Senate 
districts were estimated to have had populations of approximately 552,000, whereas 
House districts had populations of approximately 114,100 (Texas Legislative Council, 
1990).  
Final Output 
House Bill 588 became effective on September 1, 1997.  It established a uniform 
admission and reporting process to be followed by the state’s colleges and universities 
when considering admission of first-time freshman students.  Three major provisions 
were included in the bill: 
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• automatic admission for high school students graduating in the top 10 percent 
of their class; 
• optional automatic admission for students in the top 25 percent of high 
school graduating classes; and 
• 18 socioeconomic factors that can be used for admitting students who did not 
qualify under the top 10 or 25 percent rules.    
Conclusion 
 After the Hopwood ruling banned the use of race-based policies in higher 
education, the Texas Legislature responded by enacting legislation to create new criteria 
for admission policies in order to maintain diversity at the state’s colleges and 
universities.  That bill was House Bill 588.  It guarantees automatic admission to public 
colleges and universities for students who rank in the top 10 percent of their high school 
graduating class.  
 This study focused on identifying the factors that contributed to the passage of the 
bill—the external factors that impinged upon the legislature and the factors within the 
legislative process that facilitated its final passage.  Meranto’s (1967) input-output model 
was used to organize the significant factors.  Although the entire Texas Legislature was 
the original unit of analysis for this study, the analysis focused mostly on the actions of 
the Texas House of Representatives because evidence indicated that the passage of House 
Bill 588 was best explained by the conditions influencing the House.  House action 
ultimately determined the outcomes of the Senate. 
 127
 Regarding input factors, several conditions outside the Texas Legislature were 
identified.  These included:  the Hopwood ruling, Attorney General Morales’ 
interpretation of the ruling, and projected demographic changes for Texas. 
 Minority legislators who perceived an adverse affect of the Hopwood ruling on 
their constituencies sought a legislative solution to this new problem.  The data identified 
Mexican-American Senator Gonzalo Barrientos as the key legislative stakeholder who 
initiated statewide discussions.  These meetings served to arouse public opinion and 
support for remedial legislation.  Four major demand articulators that provided legislators 
with legislative input in the development of House Bill 588 were also identified.  They 
were interest groups, private citizens/constituents, state agency legislative liaisons, and 
political parties. The findings of the study supported Meranto’s (1967) suggestion that a 
legislative system is responsive to conditions existing in its environment which have been 
converted to political demands either by members of the system or by demand 
articulators.         
The input demands made by these various groups resulted in the filing of over 20 
pieces of legislation.  Each piece of legislation intended to curtail some adverse aspect of 
the Hopwood ruling.  These adverse aspects could be grouped into of four major areas:  
university admissions, financial aid for scholarships and recruitment and retention 
programs, indemnification protection for admissions officers and need for parity studies.   
A combination of factors occurring during the legislative session presented a 
challenge in developing legislation that would be acceptable to everyone.  The 75th 
Legislature convened with a new Republican-controlled Senate and a Republican 
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governor.  Republican Senator Teel Bivins, Chairman of the Senate Education 
Committee, had made it clear that only race-neutral legislation would be considered in his 
committee.  And past controversy over affirmative action policies thrust lawmakers into a 
partisan debate over admissions legislation.           
 Conditions within the Texas Legislature that favored final passage of House Bill 
588 were:  Chairman Irma Rangel’s initiative and leadership; Chairman Teel Bivins’ 
support; and the control of the House held by Democrats.  The success of House Bill 588 
was further secured through the skillful utilization of five key strategic maneuvers 
implemented by Rangel.  These strategies included:  seeking the advice of prominent 
leaders in the field of higher education; involving the governor’s office from the 
beginning of the process; keeping the bill simple; making House Bill 588 her priority; 
and exercising her power as Chair of the House Public Education Committee.  In sum, by 
the end of the session, admitting the top 10 percent of each state high school graduating 
class was an acceptable alternative to the traditional use of race in higher education 
admissions policies.  
 
Implications of the Study 
Implications for Future Research 
The findings of this study suggest various areas for further research.  First, since 
the automatic admission of the top 10 percent of graduating classes is the principle 
provision of House Bill 588, there is a need for research to determine whether the plan 
will ensure a diverse student body at state colleges and universities.  A comparative 
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analysis of schools in Texas and of Texas and other states would help determine its 
effectiveness.  The effectiveness of the top 10 percent plan should also be examined in 
states with integrated student populations where it is less likely to increase the number of 
minority students in the most selective colleges and universities.  Additionally, a 
longitudinal study is needed to examine whether enrollment and retention levels are in 
proportion to each state’s demographic composition.  This information could contain 
critical implications for each state’s educational and economic health. 
Second, after admitting the top 10 percent of high school graduating classes, 
House Bill 588 permits schools to consider other applicants on the basis of various 
socioeconomic factors.  Factors such as family poverty level, parents’ education level, a 
school district’s financial status, residence in a rural or urban area, among others, were 
determined as having significant affects on the diversity of the student populations in 
Texas.  Further research would show how these factors have hindered or helped in 
promoting diversity in Texas higher education.  Special attention should be given to those 
factors that have the most profound influence on policy outcomes.  The applicability of 
these factors to other states is also a critical area for analysis.   
Third, additional and continuing research needs to be conducted on the 
application of Meranto’s (1967) model to other legislative systems which confronted 
issues of race and admissions policies in higher education.  For example, California and 
Florida confronted challenges similar to those of Texas.  It would be useful to know if 
their legislative experiences were similar to those of Texas.  
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Fourth, study of how well the Texas Legislature’s experience fit other theoretical 
models—other than Meranto’s (1967) model that was a derivative of the systems 
approach—would add significantly to the literature on legislative policymaking.  
Similarly, comparative studies of other states legislatures would indicate how generally 
applicable these models are to legislative decision making.   
Fifth, as other states are forced to address the issue of race-neutral legislation, 
there is a need to explore other than legislative solutions.  Some work needs to be done to 
determine whether state education bureaucracies have implemented their own policies or 
played significant roles in influencing legislators.  This is particularly important since 
little attention has been given to the identification and participation of these educational 
entities, and they are oftentimes held responsible for ensuring educational equity.  Further 
research would determine how solutions proposed by education bureaucracies are similar 
or dissimilar to legislative solutions, which solutions are more successful in achieving 
policy goals, and whether or not the outcomes vary by state.        
Sixth, given the conditions within the 75th Legislature, there is a need for 
comparative case studies of legislative policymaking to examine whether different 
conditions would cause different outcomes.  Much can be learned from studies of states 
like California and Florida that have recently enacted similar legislation.  Examining 
whether or not these legislatures had key legislative stakeholders championing their 
admissions policy and whether or not they used different strategies would provide greater 
insight into legislative theory.  
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Seventh, few studies have been conducted on the influence of minority legislators 
on shaping policy outcomes.  This study suggests the need to identify the factors (e.g., 
institutions, history, culture, etc.) that have helped to determine minority legislators’ 
effectiveness in influencing legislative outcomes, and whether or not they vary from state 
to state.  More attention needs to be given to determining if minority legislators from 
different states behave in different ways, particularly in handing similar issues.  
Furthermore, work needs to be done to determine how the number of minority members 
in the legislature (less or more than in Texas) influences their behavior when dealing with 
similar issues.  Additionally, some attention should be given to key legislative positions 
held by minorities to determine if, without those positions, legislation such as minority 
access to higher education would receive legislative approval.        
Eighth, this study demonstrated that political parties have a significant affect on 
legislative outcomes.  Particularly important for this study was that Republicans 
dominated the political climate in 1997, while the 75th Legislature was split between a 
Republican Senate and Democratic House.  In Texas the Republican party tends to be 
strongly conservative, often favoring the less-government approach and opposing 
affirmative action programs.  More research needs to be conducted on the affects of 
political parties on policy issues addressing educational opportunity.  For instance, what 
happens in more traditional Republican settings versus liberal Republican settings versus 
Democratic settings?  What outcomes can be expected in a weak party versus strong 
party states?  A comparative analysis between strong governor versus weak governor 
states should also be considered.     
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Finally, to what extent have court rulings prompted legislative reaction to correct 
what the legislature perceived as an undesirable public policy?  Significant contributions 
to policymaking theory can be made by comparative studies analyzing the similarities 
and differences between legislative reactions.  One question to be addressed is whether 
there are characteristics of state court systems and legislatures that could be used to 
predict behavioral patterns of judges and legislatures on higher education issues.   
Implications for Policy Makers 
This study provides significant findings for policy makers interested in the area of 
educational public policy.  One finding indicates that minority legislators were found to 
be a natural constituency when creating public policy supporting equal educational 
opportunity.  Another finding revealed that, in the early stages of forming effective 
educational policy, it is useful to sponsor public forums to identify potential opinion 
leaders and to elicit ideas from them about acceptable solutions. 
The findings also suggest two noteworthy points for policy makers working on 
controversial issues.  First, most proposed legislation can be expected to have multiple 
sources of opposition.  As a bill becomes more complex, the potential sources of 
opposition multiply.  Thus, legislation is more likely to be successful if it is simple, and if 
potential opponents are anticipated and satisfied early in the legislative process. Second, 
since an opponent can stop a bill at any point in the process, it is essential to secure 
support for the bill at every major juncture of the process.  Therefore, policy makers 
would be well advised to test the political waters before proposing legislative solutions 
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